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Abstract 
 Intention (1957) is perhaps the most well-known work by G.E.M. Anscombe. In 
this dissertation I put this work aside and considered some of her other philosophical 
writings. Through the consideration of four articles by the author, I sought to sketch a 
plausible picture of incorrigibility in the context of philosophy of language, philosophy 
of mind and metaphysics. Those articles are: Events in the Mind (1963), The First Person 
(1975), Substance (1964), and The Intentionality of Sensation (1965). By proposing some 
fundamental distinctions I believe one can grasp the importance of incorrigible 
statements, i.e., mental reports framed in the first person in the present indicative, in 
consideration of the contexts previously mentioned. Moreover, by proposing some of 
these distinctions I believe that certain aspects of the author’s work in those articles will 
be understood with more clarity. 
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Introduction 
 In this dissertation I will focus my attention on four articles by the twentieth-
century philosopher G. E. M. Anscombe (1919 – 2001). I will analyse the articles one by 
one. The underlying theme of the dissertation as a whole is incorrigibility. This theme ties 
together both the chapters of the present work and the author’s articles. I will consider 
my overarching theme in a systematic way by first sketching my principal distinctions 
and justifying these in a plausible way. This dissertation comprises four chapters which 
we will consider in this introduction. Note that I believe that it is important that this 
dissertation is read along with the source material so as to facilitate that which is being 
said throughout. 
 Chapter 1, “Taxonomy of Mental Reports”, is based on Anscombe’s article Events 
in the Mind (1963). There I get hold of an initial understanding of my theme. In that 
chapter my interest was threefold: i) to give a deflationary account – in contrast to 
Descartes’ - of that which constitutes a mental event; ii) establishing the ‘asymmetry’ 
between the first and third person in the present indicative in mental reports; and iii) give 
a first presentation of the class of so-called incorrigible statements. I will concentrate here 
on the latter points. One can sensibly understand a mental report as a statement which 
describes an individual’s ‘inner life’, a matter-of-description which is non-publicly 
available. What does this mean? Throughout this dissertation the distinction between 
public availability and non-public availability has been established as a defining trait of 
matters-of-description. I am focused on accessibility in principal of such-and-such. In this 
sense, one’s ‘inner life’ is only available to the individual in question deeming that 
specific matter-of-description non-publicly available. This being said it is quite 
straightforward that when one describes one’s ‘inner life’ one will base one’s utterance 
on that which one is describing, i.e., one’s ‘inner life’. These mental reports are those 
which are framed in the first person of the present indicative. It may also be the case that 
one wants to describe the ‘inner life’ of some other individual. Now, it is the case that one 
cannot access another individual’s ‘inner life’ in the same way as one accesses his own. 
In other words, while one bases descriptions of one’s ‘inner life’ on one’s ‘inner life’ in 
mental reports framed in the first person of the present indicative, this is not the case with 
mental reports framed in the third person in the present indicative. When one describes 
the ‘inner life’ of some individual one bases one’s mental report on particular behaviours 
of that individual’s body, which are publicly available. That this is the case may lead to 
2 
contradiction with respect to first person descriptions of that individual’s ‘inner life’. In 
other words, it may be the case that particular behaviours – or lack thereof - of such 
individual do not necessarily imply coherence with respect to his first person report. 
Contrast this with mental reports framed in the first person in the present indicative. It 
would be quite implausible to assert that this may happen to an individual who wants to 
describe his ‘inner life’, i.e., that he would base such description on his bodily behaviours. 
It is this distinction which has been dubbed as an ‘asymmetry’. 
 The overarching theme has to do with the mental reports which are framed in the 
first person in the present indicative, i.e., incorrigible statements. As we have seen, these 
statements describe one’s ‘inner life’ and, if pressed1, are justified by appealing to said 
matter-of-description. That the possible justification of these statements is like this can 
be understood as deeming them as incorrigible, as describing that which only the utterer 
in question can access. In the first chapter my proposal was to categorize these 
incorrigible statements into two kinds: full-blown incorrigible statements (FIS) and 
derived incorrigible statements (DIS). The former describe our ‘inner lives’ tout court 
while the latter are reformulated statements based upon non-mental reports framed in the 
first person in the present indicative. These reformulated statements capture the proper 
first person perspective of the utterer of such-and-such a statement. In other words, these 
reformulated statements emphasize the original statement – which in most or all cases 
describes a publicly available state of affairs – while also bringing to the fore that one is 
conscious of thinking such-and-such, which is a non-publicly available state of affairs. 
 In order to distinguish these statements even further, I propose to classify FIS as 
members of Group A and DIS as members of Group B. The former group is subdivided 
into A1 and A2 depending on the specific verbs which we encounter. In A1 we have 
statements which contain the verb “to feel” while in A2 we have statements which contain 
such verbs as “to see”, “to hear”, etc., being that we will be particularly emphasizing 
statements which contain the verb “to see”. Statements from A2 were of my interest in 
                                                             
1 Note that this is more of a theoretical point and not a way in which one will proceed in normal linguistic 
interactions. In other words, we seem to understand in a straightforward sense the incorrigibility of such 
reports thereby leaving them unwarranted. If in principal only I am in a position to access this matter-of-
description then the justification of incorrigible statements is circular: I will justify the statement by merely 
repeating the statement in question. E.g. “I feel pain because I feel pain”. By considering this one realizes 
that justifying these statements is in a sense innocuous. Again, the point of speaking of the justification of 
these statements is to make the theoretical distinction between mental reports in the first person and in the 
third person completely evident. 
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Chapter 3 and 4, especially concerning the phrase giving the direct object of these verbs 
and the verbs themselves. 
 Chapter 2, “A-users and the Rest of Us”, is based on The First Person (1975)2. 
There I sought to establish two things: i) to reconcile Anscombe’s view that ‘I’ is not an 
expression whose function is to refer, with the more or less common sense view that ‘I’ 
refers to ‘this body’; and ii) that this reconciliation is tied with the reformulation of non-
mental reports framed in the first person which we encounter in B. A common feature of 
incorrigible statements, i.e., statements from A and B, is that the particular ‘I’ being used 
does not refer to ‘this body’. This seems to be the case because descriptions of one’s 
‘inner life’ do not describe particular behaviours of ‘this body’ but one’s ‘inner life’, 
which is non-publicly available. These statements contrast with statements like “I am 
sitting” for what is here being described is publicly available, particularly the position of 
such-and-such a body in a particular environment. It is quite clear that the ‘I’ in that 
statement does refer to ‘this body’. Now I believe that one can hold that these are two 
different uses of ‘I’ which appear in these two different linguistic contexts, i.e., in 
descriptions of one’s ‘inner life’ and in descriptions of publicly available states of affairs. 
Furthermore, it is in reformulated statements from B which this can be thoroughly grasped 
for they appear simultaneously – “I think that ‘I am sitting’”. 
 One of Anscombe’s principal theses in her paper is that ‘I’ can only refer to some 
kind of Cartesian Ego (CE) and that reflections on this object leads us into various 
problems which at least seem not to have a solution. The author uses this to question the 
assumption that ‘I’ is a term “whose logical role is to make a reference, at all”3 thereby 
putting aside such problems as stemming from “language itself being as it were possessed 
of an imagination”4. That ‘I’ – in the particular context of descriptions of one’s ‘inner 
life’ - can only refer to some kind of CE was reinstated in the chapter but the conclusion 
that that ‘I’ does not refer was sought in a different fashion through the consideration of 
the (possibly) paradoxical conclusions that are implied by assuming the existence of such 
an object. As such, the author’s principal claim is not objected to but is plausibly 
ameliorated, I claim, by accepting that there are two uses of ‘I’. One can see this by 
                                                             
2 A paper which is without a doubt a masterpiece of twentieth-century philosophy. 
3 Anscombe, G. 1975: 32. 
4 Anscombe, G. 1975: 32. 
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considering the way in which the supposed two uses avoid some criticism of Anscombe’s 
position as is considered in Chapter 2. 
 In Chapter 3, “On Substance”, which is based on the author’s article Substance 
(1964) I directed my attention to statements from A2. Now these particular statements are 
quite interesting in that the same statement can be held as describing publicly available 
state of affairs or one’s ‘inner life’. This is what distinguishes them from statements from 
A1. In this chapter my objectives were twofold: i) to show that what was previously said 
is plausible via the consideration of specific predicates in play in these statements; and ii) 
to grasp a certain conception of substance so as to expand our understanding of that which 
is publicly available. As stated by the author, there are two kinds of predicates which 
presuppose a certain conception of substance: substantial predicates and substance-
involving predicates5. The use of these predicates presuppose that that which is being 
described is made up of some kind of stuff, i.e., that the such-and-such is a physical entity. 
There are other predicates, called ‘secondary quality words’, which do not necessarily 
imply such a conception. Statements which include these describe such properties as 
colours, sounds, etc. Now one may understand substantial predicates as being used to 
categorize such-and-such into a specific substantial kind. In a sense, these predicates are 
implicit groupings of substance-involving and secondary-quality words. Depending on 
the relevance of the predicates which are grouped, one can be or not in a position to 
thoroughly grasp if that which one is describing is publicly available or not. Furthermore, 
one can be in a position where one is describing a publicly available such-and-such which 
is not made up of stuff. This is the case when the properties being considered are those 
which are described in statements including secondary quality words, the grouping of 
which are the basis for the specific substantial predicate being used in these situations. 
 When one is describing e.g. the colours of some X one may not be in a position 
to establish that that X is a physical entity, a hologram or a mirage6, or a mental image – 
which is an occurrence in one’s ‘inner life’. This is plausibly the case because these 
predicates do not necessarily imply a conception of that which is being described as e.g. 
the colours of such-and-such. As Anscombe writes: 
[Y]ou can suppose a man to see a coloured expanse without there having to be any 
substance (or, of course, collection of substances) whose expanse, or part of whose 
                                                             
5 Statements which include these describe such properties as e.g. ‘melting at 50ºC’, etc. 
6 These are publicly available but not made up of some sort of stuff. 
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expanse, it is. One of the problems of epistemology that first strikes one – did first strike 
me – is: how do I know the things I look at have behinds? Why shouldn’t they have the 
sort of merely phenomenal existence a rainbow has? This question arises because colour, 
together with its determinations of shape and size, is not substance-involving.7 
 Furthermore, one does use these predicates to describe one’s ‘inner life’. This 
opens the possibility of such predicates being used to describe non-publicly available 
states of affairs. Here we arrive at an important point about incorrigible statements. Even 
if one uses these predicates to describe such publicly available things as rainbows, which 
are not made up of stuff, one can be wrong. That is, one can incorrectly describe that X 
for it is in principle accessible to others. Being that one’s ‘inner life’ is necessarily only 
accessible to the individual in question, one may plausibly claim that the concept of truth 
does not apply to statements where these predicates are used. In another way, I take it that 
one can only possibly determine as true or false statements which describe matters-of-
description which are in principal available to others. To say that a description of a matter-
of-description which is only available to me is true implies that that statement is only true 
for me which undermines, I believe, the concept of truth as such. This being said, one can 
use these predicates in statements which can in principle be attributed a truth-value and 
in statements which plausibly cannot. The range of usage of said predicates leaves one in 
a position where one cannot determine a prori the specific availability of the matter-of-
description of the statement, if the statement is intended as describing such-and-such. In 
other words, one cannot know just by considering the statement the specific availability 
of that which is being described. 
 In Chapter 4, “How to Understand Sensation-Reports”, which is based on 
Anscombe’s The Intentionality of Sensation (1965) I continue my investigation into the 
statements previously mentioned, i.e., statements from A2 which contain the so-called 
‘secondary-quality words’. Furthermore, I considered in “On Substance” these statements 
as possibly abstracted from their specific context of utterance so as to make a point about 
the applicability of such predicates in the particular linguistic contexts explored, i.e., in 
describing publicly available and non-publicly available states of affairs. In this chapter I 
sought to make two fundamental points: i) that one can speak of that which one e.g. sees 
in incorrigible statements of A2 without with this either implying the reification of that 
which is seen or that one’s sense-organ is being affected by e.g. a mental image; and ii) 
                                                             
7 Anscombe, G. 1964: 39. 
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that the verbs which we encounter in statements of this ilk are necessarily having their 
intentional usage. Note that the particular verb may be having its intentional usage 
without necessarily implying that we are dealing with a statement which describes one’s 
‘inner life’. Now what does this mean? That is, what is an intentional usage? Anscombe 
claims that: 
Intentionality, whose name is taken from intention and expresses these characteristics of 
the concept intention, is found also in connection with many other concepts. I shall argue 
that among these are concepts of sensation.8 
 The characteristics which are alluded to in the citation are a) “possible non-
existence of the object”9; b) “non-substitutability of different descriptions of the object, 
where it does exist”10; and c) “possible indeterminacy of the object”11. In a sense, we have 
already partially covered these in the consideration of the ‘secondary-quality words’ in 
the particular context of incorrigible statements from A2. These characteristics stem from 
the particular verbs in these statements which, as the author suggests, express concepts of 
sensation which are marked by intentionality. Suppose that we are considering the 
statement “I see a red table” whose matter-of-description is my ‘inner life’. In this case 
the verb “to see” is having its intentional usage. In the same way as one would ask for the 
direct object of the verb without implying the reification of direct object – which is a 
grammatical notion – the author asks for the intentional object of the verb, which is given 
by the same phrase giving the direct object, i.e., “a red table”. 
I will now define an intentional verb as a verb taking an intentional object; intentional 
objects are the sub-class of direct objects characterized by these three connected 
features12.  
 This being said, asking for the intentional object of the verb also does not imply 
the reification of intentional object. That is, if one were asked “What do you see?” – as a 
reaction to the statement “In see a red table” – one would respond with “a red table” 
without with this implying that ‘what’ one sees is an intentional object. I will explore the 
reasoning I just outlined in more detail in Chapter 4. In contrast to the intentional usage 
of the verb we have the material usage of the verb which takes a material object. This 
                                                             
8 Anscombe, G. 1965: 4. 
9 Anscombe, G. 1965: 4. 
10 Anscombe, G. 1965: 5. 
11 Anscombe, G. 1965: 6. 
12 Anscombe, G. 1965: 6. 
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usage covers the cases where that which one is describing is publicly available for 
evaluation. Note that this usage cannot be established abstracted from the particular 
context of utterance for this depends upon one’s knowledge of the specific availability of 
that which is being described. As such, one need not know that which one is describing 
in order to interpret the verb in its intentional usage while the material usage is limited to 
contexts where one is knowledgeable of the specific matter-of-description – which is 
publicly available. One notes that it is this supposed possibility of not knowing that which 
one is describing in order to give the intentional object of the verb that opens the 
possibility of the secondary-quality words being used in the linguistic contexts previously 
presented. Given that in the case of incorrigible statements from A2 there is no material 
object – no publicly available state of affairs – which one is describing, one can only give 
the intentional object which is not to be understood as real entity, i.e., “a red table” as 
describing some real such-and-such in my ‘inner life’, but as a grammatical feature of 
these statements which serve to broaden our understanding of them. 
 We have covered in a simplified way that which will be treated in the dissertation 
as a whole. Note that there may be some incongruences between Anscombe’s work - or 
between established interpreters of her work - and my take on this theme and the articles 
here mentioned. Nonetheless, I hope that the points made in the dissertation were made 
with sufficient clarity so as to enable further discussion of the theme in question and 
heighten the interest in this most remarkable author. 
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1. Taxonomy of mental reports13 
 Let us start by asking a fundamental question: what is a mental event? Even 
though the meaning of this question might seem rather straightforward as stated, if one 
considers it more closely, its meaning is not clear. One can equally answer the same 
question with a statement giving an exemplar and a statement giving a definition. This 
consideration may lead us to clarify this ambiguity by stating the original question in two 
ways, which can be put as such: (a) “what is an example of a mental event?”14 and (b) 
“what is the ontological difference between an event in the mind and an event understood 
generally?” This is in some sense a platonic distinction. The wording of (b) may be 
curious but I am relying on the assumption that ‘to give a definition of x’ has as a 
consequence the ‘giving a way of distinguishing x’, with a particular motive, i.e., the 
distinction is generally not aimed at all there is, but at a particular sub-set of what is - it 
seems quite obvious that a mental event is not a chair; being the case that what fuels our 
inquiry is a rather subtle distinction. 
 The precise relationship between the possible answers to the two questions which 
stem from the original is obscure. Is it possible to answer (b) negatively and still answer 
(a) positively? What would a negative answer to (b) mean? That the proposed distinction 
is impossible?; or15 that we are not able to establish a distinction? “Able” here seems to 
mean something different in (b) than in (a). For example, even though the answer to (b) 
may be negative, it still seems that a positive answer to (a) may plausibly be given - is it 
implausible to give an example of a game without having a thorough definition of ‘game’? 
Nevertheless, to give a positive answer to (a) involves a certain relationship with (b), but 
a weaker one. If one can give an example of a mental event, one is able in a sense to 
‘distinguish a mental event’, even if one is not able to give (or it is impossible to give) an 
airtight definition. In other words, it seems that answering (a) positively does not 
necessarily imply consistency between the answers nor an ontological output from (b). 
To avoid this discrepancy I will slightly alter (b) into (b*): “How do we distinguish an 
event in the mind from an event understood generally”. This is useful because having (a) 
and (b*) as stated makes it impossible to give a positive answer to one and a negative 
                                                             
13 Based on Events in the Mind (1963). 
14 Obviously one can give more than one example; but for the sake of simplicity, I will maintain the question 
as such. 
15 The disjunction is inclusive. Note that it is always difficult to clarify, when it is the case that only one of 
these options is true, which one of them is true. 
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answer to the other; gaining consistency and specifying a methodology for answering (a). 
Note that a possible answer to (b*) does not necessarily imply that it has been obtained 
via an empirical investigation of the brain, nor, looking back, that ‘an empirical 
investigation of the brain’ or any other method has ontological output, i.e., answering (b*) 
is in a sense neutral. So, what is a possible answer to (b*)? As I tried to clarify, this will 
be a choice of methodology. The ability to ‘distinguish mental events’ may be maintained 
as an interpretive ability based on linguistic understanding which may be used to predict 
the behaviour of another human animal or to understand said behaviour. Anscombe’s 
motive is to understand the linguistic behaviour of human animals in order to clarify 
certain relationships between their linguistic behaviour and the world. This implies that 
to answer (a) we will have to look at how human animals report what goes on in the mind. 
 I wished to clarify what is meant by the question “what is a mental event?” in 
order to set the tone of Anscombe’s work which, for our purposes, has a first seat in her 
article Events in the Mind (1963) by bringing forth the introductory features of her work: 
a quest for linguistic understanding and not a strict inquiry into ontological grounds in the 
philosophy of mind. An excellent example of this is the compelling last words of her 
paper: 
My main conclusion is the engaging one that one thing that is not a “thought” in the sense 
Descartes gave to the Latin and French for “thought”, is: a thought.16 
 This statement shows her interest in our linguistic understanding of e.g. what 
“thought” means in our context, which may be generalized to “mental events”. The 
wording of (b*) contains the phrase “events in the mind” and not “mental events” for a 
reason: to bring out a certain conception of the mind; “in” is crucial. So, one asks, what 
does “in” mean in this context? One notices that “in” in the context of certain mental 
reports is taken for granted as with when one says “I think that I can solve the Riemann 
Hypothesis”; a possible response to this report would seem rather odd17 put as such: 
“where does this thinking take place?” The place is obvious: in the mind. But why is it 
obvious? Can we delineate the frontiers of this place? Similar questions lead us, as led 
Anscombe, to view what was meant by the latter question in seventeenth century 
philosophy, particularly Descartes’, which will help us get closer to a response to (a). 
                                                             
16 Anscombe, G. 1963: 63. 
17 A plausible response to a non-mathematician would be “Are you mad?”; a plausible response to a 
mathematician would be the same. 
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 Again, the reflection upon the seventeenth century mind-body distinction will be 
viewed through the lens of an understanding of mental reports which is coherent with are 
previously established methodology. This will mean that the particular metaphysical 
claims of the Cartesian conception of mind will be held as a consequence of a certain 
linguistic understanding of mental reports, which is a view shared by Anscombe and by 
other twentieth-century philosophers: this will justify my use of some quotes from 
Rorty.18. That language influences certain philosophical distinctions can be upheld if one 
reflects upon the reason why the mind-body distinction, as we know it, did not appear in 
Greek philosophy. Let us consider Rorty’s comment on a passage by Wallace Matson: 
One can sum up both of Matson’s points by saying that in Greek there is no way to divide 
“conscious states” or “states of consciousness” – events in an inner life – from events in 
an “external world”. Descartes, on the other hand, used “thought” to cover doubting, 
understanding, affirming, denying, willing, refusing, imagining, and feeling, and said that 
even if I dream that I see light “properly speaking this in me is called feeling, and used 
in this precise sense that is no other thing than thinking.” Once Descartes had entrenched 
this way of speaking it was possible for Locke to use “idea” in a way which has no Greek 
equivalent at all, as meaning “whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man 
thinks” or “every immediate object of the mind in thinking”.19 
 The merits of the view that language influences certain philosophical distinctions 
will not be elaborated in our inquiry, which does not mean that this point is superfluous 
for our understanding of Anscombe’s article. As we have just seen, one can hold that the 
particular way “thought” was understood by Descartes set the stage for the mind-body 
distinction by incorporating the class of the so-called psychological verbs under the head 
of “thought”. These verbs – “feeling”, “understanding”, etc. – are important for two 
reasons: i) the presence of these verbs in the context of a statement lead to the particular 
understanding that a mental state or event is being expressed; ii) the presence of these 
verbs in the context of a statement reveals the ‘asymmetry’ between the first and third 
person in the present indicative. Let us consider the latter point first. 
 
                                                             
18 Note that I am not endorsing the claim that Anscombe’s philosophical positions are identical with those 
of Rorty; the correspondence I have established between them is limited to the view that language 
influences certain philosophical distinctions like the one presently at hand. 
19 Rorty, R. 1980: 47, 48. 
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1.1 The ‘asymmetry’ between the first and third person in the present indicative 
1.1.1. The first person in the present indicative 
 That there is a difference between the first (FP) and third person (TP) in mental 
reports is evident in the way we justify those statements, framed in those two distinct 
forms. To clarify this distinction it is necessary to elaborate a further distinction between 
two different kinds of mental reports framed in the FP, which I will call full-blown 
incorrigible statements (FIS) and derived incorrigible statements (DIS). 20 The meaning 
of “incorrigible” is tied with the possible way in which some statements are justified. It 
is noteworthy that the word “indubitable”, which is used in the language of the Cartesian 
conception of mind, also captures the particular way some statements are possibly 
justified, lying the difference in the implication that the employment of those terms has 
for the truth-value of those statements. That the particular way those statements are 
justified implies that they are necessarily true is a claim which is avoided by using the 
term “incorrigible”, which I believe is neutral in this sense. 
 Before we focus on the way these particular statements are possibly justified let 
us focus on what is being described by statements framed in the FP which will help us 
clarify with more detail what is to be understood as mental reports. Let us consider the 
statements “I feel pain” and “I am walking”. One notices that it is the case that only one 
of those statements describes an observable state of affairs, being that the ocular imagery 
already implies that this is so. For what would it mean to observe what is being described 
by the statement “I feel pain”? Let us focus on another angle which puts aside the ocular 
imagery and avoids the prison of circular reasoning. A statement framed in the FP which 
describes a publicly available state of affairs has different consequences from those which 
do not. If one takes the statement “I am walking”, one notices two things i) that ‘I’ refers 
to ‘this body’ and ii) that the truth-value of this statement is dependent upon the 
‘exteriorized’ confirmation that the description is adequate. These two points are closely 
connected. Consider the latter point, especially what is being meant by “exteriorized”. 
Even though the statement “I am walking” is framed in the FP, what is being described is 
publicly available for evaluation, being the case that that statement can possibly be 
attributed a truth-value. That this is so is a direct consequence of that which is being 
referred to by ‘I’ in that particular statement - “I am walking” is here meaning “This body 
                                                             
20 Of course, the statements which we are considering are mental reports. 
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is at the moment making such-and-such movements”. These two claims cannot be made 
relative to the statement “I feel pain”. What this statement describes is not a matter-of-
description which is publicly available for evaluation. A plausible objection to this claim 
can be the realization that one can infer that such-and-such is in pain via certain 
behaviours which, in normal circumstances, accompany ‘the state of being in pain’. While 
this can be true, it may not be necessarily the case. One can be in pain without 
demonstrating that one is in pain via uttering the statement in question or via other non-
linguistic behaviours. When this is the case, the statement is not describing a publicly 
available state of affairs but one’s ‘inner life’. The phrase “inner life” is here being 
employed to bring out a distinction which is made in the Cartesian conception of mind 
between mental events and events understood generally. While this distinction is made 
by Anscombe, this does not mean that mental events are reified in the same sense as in 
the conception of mind previously mentioned. As we will see, Anscombe is not reducing 
those particular events in our ‘inner lives’ to such-and-such behaviours, which, once 
again, does not mean that they are being reified. 
 Until now we have distinguished statements which are framed in the FP into two 
broad groups. On the one hand, we have statements which describe publicly available 
states of affairs; on the other, statements which describe our ‘inner lives’. To simplify the 
matter, I will organize the statements of the latter kind into Group A. The particular 
example of a statement from Group A which we considered is a rather special kind of 
statement because the particular words which are being used to describe such-and-such 
are words which are only applied in the specific context of descriptions of our ‘inner 
lives’. There are other statements which are included in Group A which contain verbs 
which does not necessarily imply this. 
 Let us consider as an example the statement “I see red”. The use of this verb does 
not necessarily imply that who uttered that statement wants to describe his ‘inner life’. 
Depending on how we understand the particular use of the verb we will understand the 
particular application of the words which are being used to describe such-and-such in that 
statement. This is because the use of the verb “to see” can be present in statements which 
either describe publicly available states of affairs or in statements which describe our 
‘inner lives’. What clarifies this ambiguity is the context in which these statements are 
uttered. If one wants to describe one’s ‘inner life’, the verb “to see” is having what 
Anscombe calls its intentional usage; if one wants to describe a publicly available state 
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of affairs, the verb is having its material usage.21 Focusing on the words which are being 
used to describe such-and-such, when the verb is having its intentional use, those words 
are having what Anscombe calls their secondary application; and, by default, when the 
verb is having its material use, those words are having their primary application. Now 
that the ambiguity is dissolved one can attend to what is meant by the statement in these 
two distinct cases. When the verb “to see” is having its material use ‘I’ refers to ‘this 
body’ which implies that what is being described as seen can be confirmed as adequate. 
As such, this understanding of the statement excludes it from Group A because what is 
being described is a matter-of-description which is publicly available.22 The other case, 
i.e., when the verb is having its intentional use, constitutes the right kind of statement to 
be included in Group A, being the case that what is being described is one’s ‘inner life’.23 
It is noteworthy that one can clarify this ambiguity by noticing that the specific 
application of the words being used to describe such-and-such do not have the same 
consequences. Consider the statement “I see a flamboyant woman”. This statement can 
mean “This body is seeing a flamboyant woman” and “I see a flamboyant woman in my 
mind’s eye”. If one understands the statement in the former sense one can plausibly 
confront who uttered it with such questions as “Where did you see her?” or “Did you talk 
to her?” These questions are not plausible in the latter interpretation: as Anscombe says 
“[a]n image cannot in this sense have consequences, be the protasis for an apodosis”24, 
i.e., cannot be the logical antecedent in a conditional statement.25 
 We have distinguished between two kinds of statements which are to be included 
in Group A: statements which contain the verb “to feel” and statements which contain 
such verbs as “to see”, “to hear”, “to smell”, etc. in their intentional use. For the sake of 
clarity I will classify the former statements as forming a sub-group called A1, and the 
latter statements as forming the sub-group A2. Both statements from A1 and A2 describe 
our ‘inner lives’ and this is evident for three reasons i) ‘I’ does not refer to ‘this body’; ii) 
the verbs are having their intentional use; and iii) the words which are being employed in 
                                                             
21 In Chapter 3 and 4 we will consider this theme in more depth. 
22 What is being described is a ‘standing colour’. Cf. Anscombe, G. 1981: 44-56. 
23 In Chapter 4 we will be dedicated to this theme and the particular vicissitudes of this assertion. Note that 
it is the case that the intentional use of these verbs does not necessarily imply that one is describing one’s 
‘inner life’. But if one is describing one’s ‘inner life’ then the verb is having its intentional use. 
24 Anscombe, G. 1963: 63. 
25 As we will see, one can grasp this by considering that statements which describe such non-publicly 
available states of affairs are justified in a certain way. 
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describing such-and-such are having their secondary application, describing in this 
particular case sensations. 
 Let us now consider statements which are framed in the FP which are not 
thoroughly characterized by the points previously mentioned. Take the statement: “I am 
walking”. As we have seen, this statement plausibly means “This body is at the moment 
making such-and-such movements”. Even though this is the case, that statement can be 
reformulated so as to approximate the status of statements from Group A. Namely by 
reformulating them into statements which will include the particular use of the ‘I’ as was 
established in i). That statement can be reformulated as such: “I think that ‘I am 
walking’”. Notice that even though the thought-statement, i.e., “I am walking”, describes 
a state of affairs which can be publicly evaluated as adequate, what is being described in 
the reformulated statement as a whole is the description of a moment in the ‘inner life’ of 
the utterer. All statements which are framed in the FP which are not statements of Group 
A can plausibly be reformulated thus: these statements form Group B.26 
 It is also the case that some statements which describe our ‘inner lives’ are not in 
the present indicative. Consider the statement: “I felt pain”. Where would one include this 
statement? It seems as though this statement belongs in Group A because the previous 
points relative to those statements seem to apply to this one. The full grasp of the 
importance of the present indicative will be revealed in 1.2., but for now let us reflect 
upon the meaning of “I felt pain”. Even though this statement describes ‘something’ 
which occurred in the past, it is plausible to hold that what is meant by this statement is 
“I remember ‘being conscious of such-and-such sensation at a particular time in the 
past’”. Put as such, the reformulated statement is now in the present indicative. But the 
question can still be made: where would one include this statement? By considering the 
reformulated statement one realizes that there is a fundamental difference between this 
statement and statements from Group A. Namely, that what is being described is not a 
sensation, but that one has a memory with such-and-such content. Notice that even though 
the content of the memory is ‘something’ which occurred in one’s ‘inner life’ this does 
not mean that who uttered that statement is experiencing a sensation. Who uttered that 
statement is conscious of a memory whose content is such-and-such. I propose that a 
plausible classification for these statements will be their inclusion in Group B, forming a 
                                                             
26 In Chapter 2 we will consider this possibility in more detail. 
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sub-group called B1. The reason for this move is that these particular statements also 
describe, as do other statements from B, that the utterer is having a thought.27 Note that 
one does not only remember that such-and-such happened in one’s ‘inner life’ for one can 
remember/think such-and-such publicly available states of affairs. In this case, these 
particular statements are to be included in a sub-group called B2. The difference between 
statements from B1 and B2 is made by the particular thought-statement: in B1 the 
thought-statement describes one’s ‘inner life’; in B2 the thought-statement describes a 
publicly available state of affairs. We will return to this in 1.2. 
 As I have alluded to in the beginning of 1.1.1., one can establish a broad 
distinction between mental reports, being the case that some of them are what I called 
full-blown incorrigible statements (FIS) and derived incorrigible statements (DIS). The 
word “incorrigible” is here placed to capture the particular way these statements are 
possibly justified which will become clear in 1.1.2. One can fit the distinctions we have 
been making between statements of Group A and B into these ones. Statements from 
these groups describe one’s ‘inner life’ deeming them mental reports.28 Mental reports of 
Group A are FIS and mental reports from Group B are DIS. As we have seen, the broad 
difference between statements from A and B lies in the way statements from B have to 
be reformulated as to clarify the proper first person perspective of the utterer29: this is 
why I used the word “derived”.30 Mental reports which are framed in the TP are not to be 
called incorrigible as we will grasp by the end of this chapter. 
1.1.2 The third person in the present indicative 
 Let us consider the mental report “He is feeling pain”. What is the fundamental 
non-trivial difference between this statement and “I feel pain”? Both statements describe 
in a sense our ‘inner lives’. The difference lies in the way one would justify these reports. 
How would one justify “He is feeling pain”? Even though what is being described is in a 
sense the ‘inner life’ of such an individual, “he” refers to ‘that body’. Thereof, one can 
only base one’s utterance on the particular behaviour of said individual which is a publicly 
available state of affairs. In other words, one notices such behaviour and infers that ‘that 
                                                             
27 Being the case that one can hold that “I am having a memory” means “I think that …” 
28 One sees here the importance of considering the reformulation of statements framed in the FP like “I am 
walking” into “I think that ‘I am walking’”. By making this move one emphasizes the ‘inner life’ of the 
utterer, which is not explicit in “I am walking”. I will consider this in more detail in Chapter 2. 
29 Isn’t this already the case with “I felt pain?” In 1.2. I will return to this. 
30 Note that there are statements which are already in this form. Despite this, and for the sake of simplicity, 
I will also include these in B. 
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body’ is experiencing such-and-such a sensation. This being the case, there is always the 
possibility that the individual in question is not experiencing such-and-such. Even if his 
behaviour is consistent with what in most circumstances would lead us to think so. In this 
sense, if one is pressed to justify the statement “He is feeling pain” one will invoke such-
and-such behaviours. Contrast this with a mental report framed in the FP, i.e., an 
incorrigible statement. If one were pressed to justify the statement “I feel pain”, would 
one appeal to one’s bodily behaviours? This does not seem plausible. Furthermore, the 
only justification that one could give for that statement is that which is occurring in one’s 
‘inner life’, leading one to merely repeat the statement in question. That is, one’s 
justification would be circular, i.e., “I feel pain because I feel pain”. Moreover, only the 
utterer is in a position to access that which he justifies – the non-publicly available such-
and-such. This is why incorrigible statements do not need to be justified: there is no point 
to it. And in our linguistic interactions we understand this. Note that the point in 
considering the possible justification of incorrigible statements serves to distinguish in an 
explicit fashion mental reports framed in the FP and mental reports framed in the TP. 
 Consider the statement: “He is walking”31. Can one reformulate this statement in 
a similar fashion to the restating of “I am walking”? Can it be reformulated as: “He thinks 
that ‘I am walking’”? One does not have sufficient grounds to say this. Just because ‘that 
body’ is walking does not necessarily imply that we can conclude that such-and-such is 
conscious of that. One can even hold a further claim: that “He is walking” is not a mental 
report as “He is feeling pain” is. Even though both statements can be justified by 
appealing to such-and-such behaviour – which is publicly available – the particular 
description “He feels pain” leads to a particular understanding of such behaviour, which 
is not the case with “He is walking”. The statement “He is feeling pain” leads one to 
understand that the individual has an ‘inner life’ in a way which “He is walking” does 
not.32 
 If we slightly modify the statement “He is walking” to “He understands that he is 
walking” we can claim that the same predicament does not hold. Even though both 
statements possibly describe the same publicly available state of affairs, the latter 
statement emphasizes the interpretation of said behaviour in the light of that which is 
                                                             
31 Notice that “walking” is a description from de point of view of who uttered it, which does not mean that 
that individual is aware that this is the case or that the movement can be described as such. We may be 
speaking of a non-human animal. 
32 It might be a robot. 
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possibly taking place in his ‘inner life’. It still is the case that “He understands that he is 
walking” does not necessarily imply that he is conscious of his particular movements. But 
that one would utter that specific statement - “He understands that he is walking” - reveals 
that the utterer recognizes a possible ‘inner life’ in that body. Statements like “He intends 
such-and-such”, “He understands such-and-such”, “He knows such-and-such”, and “He 
believes such-and-such”33 all lead to the particular understanding which I have previously 
discussed. By introducing these specific terms, statements which would not be considered 
mental reports are understood in a different fashion.34 It is noteworthy that the presence 
of these terms in a mental report which is framed in the FP does not lead to the same 
conclusion. Consider the statement “I believe that ‘P=NP’”. What does this statement 
mean? A plausible response would be “I think that ‘P=NP’”.35 Contrast this reformulated 
statement with “He believes that ‘P=NP’”. What is being described in the latter statement 
is that the individual behaves in a way which possibly implies that he is conscious of 
such-and-such. One may base one’s utterance on his past linguistic or non-linguistic 
behaviour, or on his present utterance of that statement. By contrasting these two 
statements one realizes that those special terms previously mentioned are in a sense meant 
in an ‘exteriorized’ fashion. Even though one says “I believe such-and-such”, what one 
is possibly saying is that such-and-such is the content of a thought which I am at the 
moment conscious of. That one believes that that is so is determined by the coherence of 
one’s behaviour in accord with the content of that thought. Notice that there need not be 
coherence between what is thought and what is e.g. believed36. For what is emphasized 
with the presence of those special verbs is the behaviour of such-and-such and not 
necessarily one’s ‘inner life’. This is true of all those statements from Group C. 
An intention after all needn’t be a thought, for one can intend what one is not thinking of, 
as when one intends over a whole period to make a certain journey, but in fact seldom 
                                                             
33 These statements form a group which I will call C: the verbs included in them are special. They may be 
included in mental reports which are framed in the first person present indicative. But by making this move 
these statements are to be included in B2, as we will see. 
34 Statements which are cast in the third person present indicative which have as a matter-of-description 
certain animals. 
35 Particular statements of this kind form a sub-group of B3. Note that the matter-of-description of the 
thought-statement can be understood as publicly available. But I will choose to separate these so as to 
emphasize the metaphysical-like character of that which is being described in the thought-statement. The 
claim that mathematical and logical statements describe states of affairs will not be explored in this work. 
36 One may be said to believe something without having explicitly thought of it before. 
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thinks of it, and when one even thinks of it, one’s thoughts aren’t to the effect that one is 
going to make that journey.37 
1.2 Mental reports and ‘what’ they express. A deflationary account of what 
constitutes a mental event 
 An important point made until now was the distinction between publicly available 
and non-publicly available states of affairs. By doing this I have reiterated in a weak sense 
the Cartesian distinction between mind and body, between mental events and events 
understood generally. 
This was not a distinction between human faculties but a distinction between two series 
of events, such that many events in one series shared many characteristics with many 
events in the other, while nonetheless differing toto caelo because one was an event in 
extended, and the other in nonextended, substance. It was more like a distinction between 
two worlds than like a distinction between two sides, or even parts, of a human being.38 
 Once again, the objective of my inquiry is to give an account of mental reports in 
a way which will lead us to plausibly answer (a). Such answer does not necessarily imply 
the reification of said events but that certain linguistic behaviours are to be understood in 
a particular fashion. In the beginning of 1.1.1 it was alluded to that one can differentiate 
mental reports which are framed in the FP and TP in the present indicative by attending 
to the way they would be justified. By considering this one brings out the plausible claim 
that “mind” does not mean “consciousness”, which is not the case with the Cartesian 
conception of mind. As was mentioned, if one were to justify mental reports which are 
framed in the FP one would appeal to that which is present to consciousness, while mental 
reports which are framed in the TP can be justified by appealing to certain behaviours of 
‘that body’. The importance of considering the supposed justification of incorrigible 
statements reveals that those mental reports express in a sense ‘presence to 
consciousness’, which is not the case with non-incorrigible statements like those from 
Group C. In other words, mental reports which are incorrigible may be said to express 
that ‘something’ meaningful is taking place in one’s ‘inner life’ while statements which 
are non-incorrigible lead to a meaningful interpretation of particular behaviours. If this is 
the case, then one can plausibly claim that mental reports which express that ‘something’ 
meaningful is taking place in one’s ‘inner life’ are the correct statements one should 
                                                             
37 Anscombe, G. 1963: 59. 
38 Rorty, R. 1980: 51, 52. 
19 
interpret as expressing mental events. This is why the Cartesian conception of mind is an 
overly inclusive linguistic arrangement for what may be claimed to be a plausible answer 
to (a) is restricted to ‘sensations’ and ‘thoughts’ and not open to ‘intentions’, 
‘understandings’, ‘knowings’ and ‘beliefs’. Note that one may still claim that statements 
from C are mental reports for they report on some individual’s ‘inner life’. As such, the 
set of mental descriptions does not have the same members as the set of statements which 
express consciousness; rather, the set of statements which express consciousness form a 
sub-set of mental descriptions. 
 We have touched on the claim that, if pressed, one would justify mental reports 
which are stated in the TP by appealing to statements which describe past behaviours of 
such-and-such. This is the case because these statements emphasize the coherence of 
one’s behaviour in a way which makes plausible that ‘something’ is taking place in one’s 
‘inner life’. Which, again, does not necessarily imply that one is conscious of such-and-
such. This is not the case with incorrigible statements, i.e., mental reports from A and B. 
If one were pressed to justify those statements one would appeal to what is presently 
taking place in one’s ‘inner life’, which need not be coherent with what happened in one’s 
‘inner life’ in the past. This can be seen as what distinguishes statements from A from the 
thought-statements from statements from B1. The former describe what is presently 
taking place in one’s ‘inner life’, which is not the case with the thought-statements of 
mental reports from B1. This is important. Let us concentrate on the thought-statement 
from a mental report from B1 e.g. “being conscious of such-and-such sensation at a 
particular time”. If one were to justify this statement, what would one appeal to? Can one 
remember the sensation in question? 
One is very strongly inclined to think that, because “I had a thought then” or “I suddenly 
remembered” refer to particular moments of time, the right thing to look at is something 
that took place then, as you would look at the mechanism of a clock when the clock struck 
to see what happened then, for the clock striking is an event in the history of the clock 
mechanism.39 
 It is plausible that one would not justify that statement – the thought-statement – 
by appealing to that which is presently occurring in one’s ‘inner life’. That is, it may be 
the case that one would appeal to past behaviours – a publicly available such-and-such – 
                                                             
39 Anscombe, G. 1963: 62. 
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or the like which do not necessarily imply that one was conscious of such-and-such 
sensation at that particular time. These considerations may lead us to doubt the 
straightforward way in which statements from B1 were classified.40 That is, one may be 
unsure if the thought-statements in mental reports from B1 describe publicly available or 
non-publicly available states of affairs which implies that one may be sceptical of what 
was said in 1.1.1 – that the thought-statement in these mental reports describe one’s ‘inner 
life’. 
 As we have seen, mental reports can be considered as forming three distinct 
groups. On the one hand, we have mental reports from Groups A and B which are framed 
in the FP, and on the other mental reports like those from Group C which are framed in 
the TP. The difference between these statements can be made by considering, for the sake 
of argument, the way in which they would be justified: statements from Groups A (FIS) 
and B (DIS) may be said to be incorrigible while statements from C may not. As such, 
mental reports which are incorrigible imply the expression of consciousness, which may 
not be the case with statements from C. An important distinction to be made between 
statements from A and B is the way in which one can separate the content of that which 
is occurring in one’s ‘inner life’ and that which is occurring in one’s ‘inner life’. By 
considering statements from B – as we will see in Chapter 2 – we can emphasize 
consciousness of the thought taking place or the specific content of that thought, while 
this distinction is not made in statements from A41. 
 This being said, and if these considerations are correct, one can plausibly claim 
that what one can understand as a mental events is limited to ‘sensations’ and ‘thoughts’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
40 It can be the case that one’s memory is a mental image. In this case, one is seeing such-and-such in the 
mind’s eye so to speak. When this is the case, these mental reports are included in A2. 
41 “[F]or the notions of an experience and a content of experience go together.” Anscombe, G. 1963: 61. 
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2. A-users and the rest of us42 
 In the last chapter my main endeavour was to reasonably answer question (a) 
through a consideration of a particular ‘class’ of statements which may be called mental 
reports. These statements were of our particular interest because they describe one’s 
‘inner life’, the presumable ‘arena’ where mental events take place. Even though this is 
the case, it was recognized that mental reports do not describe one’s ‘inner life’ in the 
same way, being that the particular framing of these statements is fundamental. This 
difference was dubbed the ‘asymmetry’ between the first (FP) and third person (TP) in 
the present indicative which is brought out in the particular consequences of these 
statements, particularly in the way they possibly are justified. Consider the mental reports 
“I have a headache” and “He has a headache”. While the former mental report is based 
upon one’s ‘inner life’, the latter is based upon specific behaviours of a particular body 
which in normal circumstances leads to that understanding. This is the case because one 
can only be aware in a direct fashion of one’s ‘inner life’, remaining the particular events 
in the ‘inner life’ of others not accessible in this fashion. As such, if one is pressed to 
justify the former mental report one will not appeal to particular behaviours of one’s own 
body - or of others - but to the matter-of-description of the statement in question, i.e., the 
headache. These mental reports, which are distinguishable from those which are framed 
in the TP, were called incorrigible for only the utterer in question is in a position to 
espouse such a statement. Only the utterer has the uniquely privileged access to that 
matter-of-description, i.e., his ‘inner life’. 
 Now, it was said that one may make a distinction between full-blown incorrigible 
statements (FIS) and derived incorrigible statements (DIS). The distinction was 
essentially based on the fact that not all statements framed in the FP are mental reports 
nor incorrigible.43 Despite this being the case, one may slightly alter these statements as 
to be so. Consider the statement “I have a watch on my wrist”. Despite the framing, we 
may not consider this statement as describing the hypothetical utterer’s ‘inner life’. Any 
cognitively apt human being which can understand these words, when suitably placed, is 
in a position to deem the predicate as adequate or inadequate by attending to the particular 
object being denoted, which in this case is identical with the object which uttered the 
statement in question. This is not the case with mental reports like “I have a headache” 
                                                             
42 Based on The First Person (1975). 
43 Note that a statement framed in the FP is a mental report if and only if it is incorrigible. 
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for even though such-and-such individual uttered the statement, determining the 
adequacy of the predicate cannot be fulfilled by attending to the utterer’s body nor such-
and-such behaviours of that body. The same is true of the utterer. It would strike us as 
particularly odd that one would base the statement “I have a headache” on such-and-such 
behaviours of one’s body in the same fashion as one utters a mental report in the TP. The 
possibility of correcting this description from the point of view of another individual leads 
one to reason that the utterer lacks - at least in that moment - the privileged access that 
we associate with the utterance of incorrigible statements with one’s ‘inner life’. The 
point of reformulating statements framed in the FP into incorrigible statements is to 
emphasis this privileged access. For one to utter the statement “I have a watch on my 
wrist” one must at least be aware of something, even if one’s statement is false or one is 
not at the moment aware of one’s body or of one’s surroundings. This awareness or 
consciousness is consistent with the irreducible point of view of utterances framed in the 
FP. In other words, even if ‘I’ in non-mental reports framed in the FP refers to one’s body 
we may grant that one is conscious of this. 
 In Chapter 1 the reformulation of non-mental reports framed in the FP took the 
form “I think that ‘X’”. Putting aside possible cases where this form leads to the 
understanding that the utterer is unsure of his statement, the verb “to think” makes 
palpable that some mental event is taking place in one’s ‘inner life’ and that “the language 
giving a thought is having its primary application”.44 This last point is important. That 
‘X’ is having its primary application, i.e., describes a publicly available state of affairs, 
permits the claim that these reformulated statements are mental reports and at the same 
time that they contain descriptions of publicly available states of affairs: the latter may be 
called thought-statements. In this way, all statements framed in the FP can be held as 
mental reports; and, as such, as incorrigible. The importance of distinguishing the use that 
‘I’ has in these contexts is paramount. It is opportune to clarify an important feature of 
incorrigible statements: even though incorrigible statements are not contradicted, in the 
limit, by statements which describe publicly available states of affairs (“I am in pain” – 
“But you don’t look like it” – “Nevertheless, I am”) it is the case that most descriptions 
of one’s ‘inner life’ are coherent with adequate exteriorized descriptions of particular 
behaviours of one’s body. E.g. in most cases reports of one ‘being in pain’ are coherent 
with particular behaviours that are characteristic of one ‘being in pain’. It may be because 
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of this that the inclination to assume that there is only one use of ‘I’ - the one which refers 
to one’s body - comes from. By proposing the reformulation of non-mental reports framed 
in the FP these features are brought out as is straightforwardly the case with statements 
from A. 
 In this chapter I will be concentrating on this possible distinction between the two 
uses of ‘I’. In 2.1 I will use two thought-experiments presented by the author herself – the 
one in 2.1.1 is exactly the same while the one in 2.1.2 is slightly modified – so as to clarify 
this supposed distinction which I will be asserting. In 2.2 we will be considering the 
possible referent of the relevant ‘I’ – that which appears in the context of incorrigible 
statements – possible difficulties with its postulation and a reaffirmation of Anscombe’s 
surprising thesis: that ‘I’ does not refer. 
2.1 Two uses of “I” 
 A fundamental point which is the basis of Anscombe’s article is the claim that 
Descartes’s reasoning in the Meditations stems from the understanding that “this I, is not 
any kind of body.”45 That is, she observes that Descarte’s use of ‘I’ in his argumentation 
for his dualism directs our attention not to that spatiotemporal entity but to a different 
thing which is what he really is. Now, as was seen, this is coherent with my understanding 
that there is a use of ‘I’ which does not refer to ‘this body’. Furthermore, to grasp this use 
of ‘I’ we must consider the specific context in which it appears, i.e., in the context of 
incorrigible statements. This being said, if this is the case then it seems quite plausible 
that one may distinguish the referent of the name “Descartes” – as being “that figure in 
the world of his time, that Frenchman, born of such-and-such a stock and christened 
René”46 – and the referent of ‘I’ in the mouth of that man.47 Anscombe basis this 
distinction on the possibility of one speaking of oneself without knowing that this is the 
case. One may clearly understand this point by considering the following: some 
individual Z is reading a diary which, unbeknownst to him, was written by a secret 
admirer. As is expected, the admirer refers to Z in her diary via the use of his name, i.e., 
‘Z’. Now, given the precarious situation of Z, he is in a position where he is reading about 
himself without this being known to him. As was said, this is quite plausible. But it does 
not seem to be the case that this may happen when he uses ‘I’. That is, it does not seem 
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to be the case that when individual Z uses ‘I’ when speaking of himself that he may not 
be knowledgeable of his self-referring. 
 Returning to our initial point, if the gist of Descartes’ reasoning was that the 
reference of ‘I’ is indubitable – “[t]he thinking that thinks this thought”48. It is quite 
plausible to assume that the possibility of not knowing that one is referring to oneself via 
the use of one’s name seems to distinguish the referent of “Descartes” and that of ‘I’ in 
the mouth of the latter. In other words, the utterance of one’s name in the context of self-
descriptions does not necessarily imply that one knows that this is the case while the use 
of ‘I’ is, in this sense, sure-fire. That lack of knowledge of one’s self-description when 
one uses ‘I’ does not seem to be the case can be seen as justifying the supposition that the 
referent of ‘I’ is indubitable. Before we get into the possible referent of ‘I’ in that context, 
it is quite important to show that the use of ‘I’ is not stained with this possibility, i.e., of 
not knowing that one is describing oneself when one uses ‘I’. To do this we will consider 
a thought-experiment which will hopefully elucidate this point. 
2.1.1 A-users and I-users 
Imagine a society in which everyone is labelled with two names. One appears on their 
backs and at the top of their chests, and these names, which the bearers cannot see, are 
various: “B” to “Z” let us say. The other, “A”, is stamped on the inside of their wrists, 
and is the same for everyone. In making reports on people’s actions everyone uses the 
names on their chests or backs if he can see these names or is used to seeing them (…) 
Reports on one’s own actions, which one gives straight off from observation, are made 
using the name on the wrist. Such reports are made, not on the basis of observation alone, 
but also on that of inference and testimony or other information. B, for example, derives 
conclusions expressed by sentences with “A” as subject, from other people’s statements 
using “B” as subject.49 
 Given this presentation, their use of ‘A’ seems quite similar to our use of ‘I’. But 
note that even though the location of the names on the bodies of these people is marked 
by an important difference in location, both names are still marked on their bodies. One 
can see how it is quite plausible, in the context of this society, to assume that both ‘A’, in 
the mouth of B, and ‘B’ in the mouth of others refers to that body. Just as with I-users, it 
is quite possible that B may refer to himself via ‘B’ without knowing that this is the case. 
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Or that someone might be referring to B by using ‘B’ without this individual knowing. 
Being this plausibly the case, it remains to be asked if the same can also happen with the 
use of ‘A’ in the mouth of B. It was said that because of the specific location of ‘B’ on 
B’s back that he learns this name in a more or less indirect fashion. In this sense, this 
strengthens the case being made of the possibility of ‘lack of knowledge’ with the use of 
this name. Contrast this with the possibility of some I-user having a nickname without 
him knowing that that name refers to him. Or even one referring to this I-user using a 
pronoun like ‘he’ without the individual knowing that he is being referred to by it. The 
case with the use of ‘I’ – and presumably with that of ‘A’ – is different. On the one hand, 
one only uses – as presumably is the case with A-users – ‘I’ to refer to oneself; and not 
to others, and on the other, one does not need to look at that which one is referring to 
when one uses ‘I’. In other words, it seems to be the case that by everyone using ‘I’ – or 
‘A’ – only to refer to themselves avoids the possibility of such mishaps. Furthermore, the 
possibility of ignorance with respect to the referent of the term does not seem to be 
plausible. Again, one may need confirmation from others on the referent of ‘he’, a 
nickname or the particular use of one’s given name but not that of ‘I’. This being said, is 
this also the case with ‘A’? 
 Here one cannot give a straightforwardly affirmative response. Note that the A-
users, as imagined, describe their behaviours by observing that which they are doing. This 
is a key point. It does not seem to be the case that an I-user needs to observe what he is 
doing in order to describe said behaviour. This is not to say that one cannot be wrong; but 
it seems quite plausible that an I-user need not observe his behaviour in order to describe 
it. We will return to this point further on. Now the A-users do not proceed in this fashion. 
They need to observe their own behaviours in order to describe them in a similar way as 
they would proceed to describe the behaviours of others. In this sense, when they use ‘A’ 
to refer to themselves, they are referring to that body. In other words, for the A-users the 
only factor which distinguishes the use of ‘A’ from that of their other names is that it is 
easier to use ‘A’ because of its location on their bodies. But the reference of ‘A’ and of 
their other name is identical, i.e., that body. This is why one can imagine situations like 
the following: B confuses the marking ‘A’ on C’s body for the name of that individual. 
In this situation, B is in a position where he is referring to himself without knowing that 
he is doing so. In other words, he thinks he is referring to individual C in total ignorance 
of the fact that he is referring to himself via the use of ‘A’. This is what distinguishes the 
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use of ‘A’ and that of ‘I’: the possibility of ignorance of the appropriate referent of the 
term. 
 Note that this does not mean that ‘I’ does not refer to ‘this body’, as such. 
Furthermore, it seems quite plausible that there are contexts in which ‘I’ does refer to 
such-and-such a body. But if this is the case we must account for the presumable sure-
fire knowledge of one’s self-referring when one uses ‘I’. We have, therefore, a certain 
difficulty in reconciling these two uses. For following what was previously said, there is 
a use of ‘I’ which is identical to that of ‘A’ which implies that it is possible to use ‘I’ 
without one knowing that one is referring to oneself. It is the purpose of the reformulation 
of non-incorrigible statements, framed in the FP, into incorrigible statements to make the 
rapprochement of these two uses. To make this point, let us consider another thought-
experiment. 
2.1.2 The sensory deprivation tank 
 Let us imagine a situation where a mad scientist puts me in a tank where I am 
fully anesthetized; I cannot feel anything, my body parts are arranged in a way which does 
not permit any limb to touch the other. Moreover, my sight, hearing, etc. is cut off. In 
other words, I am not, in this situation, aware of my body or of my surroundings. Despite 
this, I am conscious. From my perspective, I may not even have a body! Given my 
unfortunate situation, I want to communicate to the mad scientist – “I can’t move my 
arms!” I exclaim. Now does the ‘I’ in that statement refer to ‘this body’? From the mad 
scientist’s perspective there seems to be no doubt to the matter: ‘I’ does refer to the body 
in the sensory deprivation tank (SDT). But is this the case from my perspective? As was 
said, the peculiar situation can motivate such doubts as to the existence of my body for I 
cannot confirm that my body is there. When saying “I can’t move my arms!” in the SDT 
I may be in a position where I am referring to myself without knowing if I am there. And 
this is something which, presumably, the use of ‘I’ is isolated from: the lack of knowledge 
relative to that which is being referred to. Note that in the SDT, despite my precarious 
situation I am still aware of my ‘inner life’. To reinforce this let us reformulate the 
statement into: “I think that ‘I can’t move my arms!’”, where the ‘I’ in the thought-
statement – that which is between the inner quotes – refers to ‘this body’. This being said, 
one can grasp the two uses of ‘I’ here in play. On the one hand, one may still be in a 
position where one is ignorant of the referent of the ‘I’ in the thought-statement while 
maintaining the important feature which we started off considering, i.e., that lack of 
27 
knowledge relative to the referent of ‘I’ – in this case, the outer ‘I’ – in self-descriptions 
does not seem to be the case. In other words, by reformulating the statement one can grasp 
the ‘I’ which functions in a similar fashion as ‘A’ did in the imagined society and 
reinforce the ‘I’ which does not. It is this latter ‘I’ which is of interest to Anscombe and 
presumably to Descartes. Once again, I am in a situation where I may not knowledgeable 
of the existence of my body, nonetheless being able to use the relevant ‘I’ in a way which 
I am not ignorant of my self-referring. This being said, if the relevant ‘I’ is a referring 
expression, one can plausibly assume that it does not refer to a publicly available state of 
affairs like the immersion of my body in the SDT. Moreover, that there seems to be no 
lack of knowledge which accompanies the use of the relevant ‘I’ seems to indicate that 
the possible referent of that term is, in a sense, indubitable. 
 The point about the mad scientist, i.e., that for him there is no difference between 
the supposed two uses of ‘I’, is fundamental. In the beginning of this chapter it was said 
that incorrigible statements, i.e., descriptions of our ‘inner lives’, are not contradicted, in 
the limit, by descriptions of our bodies or bodily behaviours. That is, descriptions of our 
‘inner lives’ are mostly coherent with exteriorized descriptions of that which is taking 
place in our ‘inner lives’. This is why this distinction is not usually made: given that this 
coherence is overwhelmingly the case, other individuals need not consider a possible use 
of ‘I’ where it does not refer to ‘this body’. This is the reason for saying that for the mad 
scientist there is no question as to my reference to my body via the use of ‘I’. Now from 
my perspective in the SDT I can clearly grasp the distinction where one ‘I’ may fail to 
refer – my body may not be there – nonetheless maintaining a use of ‘I’ which is sure-
fire. But why is it sure-fire? In other words, how can I be in this situation and still know 
that I am referring to myself? A possible answer is that what the relevant ‘I’ refers to is 
not a body. What it refers to is “[t]he thinking that thinks this thought”50. That is, it seems 
that I only need to be aware of my ‘inner life’ in order to guarantee that I know that I am 
referring to myself by the use of the relevant ‘I’. In other words, it seems that, from the 
SDT, the existence of my body is not necessary for me to know that I am referring to 
myself via the use of the relevant ‘I’. And, it seems, the referent of the relevant ‘I’ – 
presumably, what I really am – is guaranteed by just thinking. This is why it was said that 
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the possible referent of the relevant ‘I’ is indubitable. Furthermore, if that term does refer 
it can only refer to an indubitable such-and-such. 
 These points need more attention if we are to continue. By reformulating non-
incorrigible statements framed in the FP into incorrigible statements we can, in a sense, 
reconcile descriptions of publicly available states of affairs and descriptions of non-
publicly available states of affairs, i.e., descriptions of one’s ‘inner life’. By considering 
the reformulation of the statement uttered in the SDT one can see this – “I think that ‘I 
can’t move my arms!’”. The statement as a whole describes my ‘inner life’ while the 
thought-statement describes a publicly available state of affairs, as I have been insisting. 
Now because of my immersion in the SDT I am not in a position to confirm the publicly 
available state of affairs which is described in the thought-statement: that my body is in 
such-and-such a situation and that my arms cannot move. Despite my inability to do so I 
am still aware of such-and-such a mental event, that I thought of such a publicly available 
such-and-such. Moreover, I am aware that I thought this. Being this the case, it is sure-
fire that I am speaking of myself when using the outer ‘I’ – “I think …” – while this may 
not be said of the ‘I’ in the thought-statement for, from my perspective, my body may not 
be there. But note that from the perspective of the mad scientist he can confirm that what 
is being described in the thought-statement is the case, but not that I thought that. This is 
why the reformulation can only be made from the perspective of the utterer and not from 
that of the mad scientist, for as we saw in Chapter 1 one may wrongly infer from 
behaviours of a body to the occurrence of mental events. I believe that it is not only in 
this situation that one can reformulate statements into incorrigible ones, but it is in these 
unique situations that the utterer, from his perspective, may grasp this possibility. Note 
that it is the statement as a whole which is incorrigible and not the description of such-
and-such a publicly available state of affairs, which may be attributed a truth-value upon 
confirmation. Another point which is captured in the reformulation is the one made in 
2.1.1, i.e., that I-users do not need to observe their behaviours in order to describe them. 
This may be said to be the case because one has an immediate awareness of one’s ‘inner 
life’ and taking into account the mental events of our interest in this moment, i.e., 
thoughts, one may say that these are in most circumstances about publicly available states 
of affairs. As Anscombe says: 
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When one reads Locke, one wants to protest: “The mind is not employed about ideas, but 
about things – unless ideas are what we happen to be thinking about.”51 
 In this sense, one may say that when one describes one’s body or behaviours of 
that body straight off it is because one is immediately aware of such-and-such a mental 
event which is about a particular publicly available circumstance. I believe that this is 
captured in the reformulation of statements framed in the FP, which are not incorrigible, 
in that the awareness of the thought is explicit and so is that which the thought is about. 
2.2 The Cartesian ego 
 Following what was said in 2.1 one may say: i) when one uses ‘I’ it seems to be 
the case that it is sure-fire that one is referring to oneself; ii) by contrasting A-users and 
I-users one can plausibly assert that if ‘I’ referred to ‘this body’ then I-users would be 
like A-users, where the latter may be in a situation where they refer to themselves via ‘A’ 
without knowing this, as may be the case with one’s given name; iii) by considering the 
SDT we strived to distinguish the supposed two uses of ‘I’ by reflecting on the possibility 
of using ‘I’ to refer to ‘this body’ without knowing if that body is there. While still 
maintaining a use of ‘I’ that is sure-fire as to one’s self-referring – it is this latter ‘I’ which 
distinguishes A-users from I-users. 
 This being said, one can understand that which was meant in Chapter 1 as the 
common feature of statements from A and B: that ‘I’ in this context does not refer to ‘this 
body’. Now if this ‘I’ is a term whose function is to refer, it must refer to an indubitable 
such-and-such, “[t]he thinking that thinks this thought”52.In other words, being plausibly 
the case that one may reformulate utterances so as to capture the first person perspective 
of the utterer – the awareness of his ‘inner life’ – we may say that the possible referent of 
the relevant ‘I’ accompanies every utterance and every thought of such-and-such an 
utterer. Furthermore, whatever the possible referent is one may say that it is non-publicly 
available, i.e., only the utterer may access it, if this is a possibility. Remember what was 
said in the SDT: only by considering those special circumstances can one grasp the 
relevant use of ‘I’ in an explicit fashion. Moreover, this use is made explicit in the specific 
context of descriptions of our ‘inner lives’. This being said, it is quite plausible to say that 
if that ‘I’ does refer then its referent is to be found in our ‘inner lives’, i.e., it is non-
                                                             
51 Anscombe, G. 1965: 5. 
52 Anscombe, G. 1975: 31. 
30 
publicly available. Just as with mental events, which are non-publicly available and 
therefore accessible in an immediate fashion, we are to suppose that the referent of the 
relevant ‘I’ is also. Similar considerations are what led philosophers such as Hume into 
quarrelsome thoughts about this matter. Anscombe writes: 
So some racked their brains over what this invisible subject and the ‘thinking of it’ could 
be; others thought there was no such thing, there were just all the objects, and hence that 
“I”, rather, was the name of the whole collection of perceptions. But that hardly fitted its 
grammar, and anyway – a problem which utterly stumped Hume – by what was I made 
into a unity? (…) Yet others denied that the self was invisible, and claimed that there is a 
unique feeling of oneself which is indiscernible but very, very important, especially in 
psychology, in clinical psychology, and psychiatry.53 
 Anscombe concludes that these questions as to that which the referent of the 
relevant ‘I’ is are quite innocuous and redirects her attention to that which originates all 
these problems: the assumption that the relevant ‘I’ is a term whose function is to refer at 
all. And this is not a problem. That is, for the author one may explain all that has been 
said about the relevant ‘I’ without postulating such an object. When one uses ‘I’ it is the 
case that one cannot use this without knowing that which one is referring to because one 
is not referring to anything. As Anscombe says: 
With names, or denoting expressions (in Russell’s sense) there are two things to grasp: 
the kind of use, and what to apply them to from time to time. With “I” there is only the 
use.54 
 In other words, exploring the relevant ‘I’ means exploring the context in which it 
appears without assuming that this word refers. Once again, the reasoning is that if the 
relevant ‘I’ refers it can only refer to some kind of CE - “[t]he thinking that thinks this 
thought”55 – and being the case that the possible reference gives rise to insurmountable 
problems, one may question the assumed function of the relevant ‘I’ as a referring 
expression. This may be a valid way of reasoning. I propose that one can plausibly negate 
that there is a reference of the relevant ‘I’ in another way. 
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2.2.1 The paradox 
 Let us imagine again my immersion in the SDT and all that this implies, i.e., I 
cannot feel anything but I am aware of my thoughts. In this sense, the latter are the only 
non-publicly available states of affairs I am aware of. I begin to try to investigate the 
referent of the relevant ‘I’ which, as I have plausibly conceded, is indubitable and non-
publicly available, i.e., I am the only one who can access it. Moreover, it must be said 
that whatever it is, it is that which is presented with these thoughts: my body may not be 
there, but there is a something which is aware or presented with these thoughts. As such, 
we may characterize the CE as: that which is presented with all non-publicly available 
states of affairs (CE1), which in this case are only thoughts. Given this, one may presume 
that the CE is presented to itself, for whatever it is, it is also non-publicly available. 
 In what way is the CE presented to itself? As was said, one is only aware of 
thoughts. Therefore, if the CE is presented to itself then it is presented to itself as a 
thought. In other words, it is presented to itself as a mental event. This is problematic. 
Granting that it is presented to itself in this way, it is quite difficult to plausibly assert that 
any thought can be characterized as the CE was. Is it plausible to say that a mental event, 
i.e., a thought, can be presented to itself? We would rather say that a thought, whatever it 
is, cannot be self-aware. Note that ‘being self-aware’ and ‘being presented to itself’ can 
be understood in a similar fashion. That is, it seems plausible to say that when one is 
aware of such-and-such one is presented with such-and-such in a certain way. E.g. one is 
aware of one’s ‘inner life’ in an immediate fashion; or, as one may say, one is presented 
with one’s ‘inner life’ in an immediate fashion. Being this plausibly the case, it seems 
that one may not admit that the postulated CE qua thought can be characterized in this 
way. The specific circumstances of the SDT solely permit one to be aware of thoughts, 
and not sensations, which reduces the possibility of the possible referent of the relevant 
‘I’ being presented to itself in another way. Supposing that the CE can be presented to 
itself as a thought leads one into a position where one must characterize a thought as 
(CE1), which is problematic in that we will not grant that a thought can be characterized 
in this way. Therefore, we arrive at a contradiction: the CE qua thought must be 
characterized as in (CE1) and at the same time it is reasonably the case that a thought 
cannot be characterized in that fashion, i.e., as being presented to itself. Furthermore, 
given my specific situation, there is no other way in which the CE can be presented to 
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itself – remember that I am not aware of publicly available states of affairs nor of any 
kind of sensation for I am anaesthetized. 
 This being said, it seems to be the case that the CE cannot be presented to itself. 
Note that, as we considered in Chapter 1, the ‘I’ in descriptions of sensations of A1 and 
A2 is the relevant ‘I’ which we are investigating. Therefore, our reasoning could also be 
made by considering the matter-of-description of these statements, which is also non-
publicly available. Despite this, the SDT brings out the difference of the two uses of ‘I’ 
in more explicit fashion because we are considering the reformulation of non-incorrigible 
statements framed in the FP into incorrigible statements, which is the proper context of 
the relevant ‘I’. Now even though one may not grant that the postulated CE can be 
presented to itself, one need not get rid of such a CE yet. Even though it may not be 
possible to be aware of it, one may still suppose it. But by doing this we change our 
understanding of it. One may still grant that it is non-publicly available – such questions 
as “Where is it?” still do not apply – and that it is indubitable. This latter point will not be 
made by saying that it is immediately aware of itself, but that one may presume it on the 
basis that there must be a ‘something’ which is aware of such non-publicly available states 
of affairs. That is, if I am thinking there must be that which thinks that thought, which 
nonetheless cannot be presented to itself. Remember that in the SDT the existence of my 
body can be doubted. Following this, one may characterize the possible referent of the 
relevant ‘I’ as: that which is presented with all non-publicly available states of affairs 
which are not presented to themselves (CE2), which in this case are only thoughts. In this 
way we avoid falling into the characterization given in (CE1) and at the same time still 
maintain this object as a possible referent for that term. Furthermore we emphasize, 
through (CE2), that non-publicly available states of affairs like thoughts are not presented 
with themselves which was what led us into the problem with (CE1). 
 Now this also problematic. Moreover, it seems that we have arrived at a paradox. 
If all that which was previously said is correct, then we may doubt that such an object 
exists. Given (CE2) we must concede that the CE is presented to itself. As we have seen, 
one plausibly negated the possibility of the referent of the relevant ‘I’ as being presented 
to itself for the only way in which it could be presented with itself was qua a thought. 
Given that a thought cannot be characterized in this fashion, we concluded that the CE 
cannot also be characterized in this fashion, being that it was the only way in which it 
could. But if we do this we must infer that it does. That is, that the CE is presented with 
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itself because it is a non-publicly available such-and-such which is not presented with 
itself. Furthermore, if it is a non-publicly available such-and-such which is presented with 
itself then it cannot be presented with itself. 
 If it is the case that the postulation of such a CE is followed by the paradox just 
described then one may plausibly hold that the postulation of such an object may be 
doubted. In other words, given that the postulation of the possible referent of the relevant 
‘I’ leads us into an absurd conclusion it is plausibly the case that one may be sceptical of 
postulating it. An important feature of this CE – one may say in Descartes’ view, a 
fundamental aspect – is that of it being indubitable. Given that one may plausibly try to 
avoid such a postulation because of its consequences, entirely defeats its purpose as the 
object which is referred to by the ‘I’ whose use leaves no doubts as to that which is being 
referred to. This being said, I believe that one can double down on Anscombe’s 
conclusion by considering what was previously presented, i.e., that the paradox56 is 
symptomatic of there plausibly being no referent for the relevant ‘I’. 
2.2.2 Consideration of the problem of the absence of reference 
 One may hold that, therefore, there is one ‘I’ which does refer to ‘this body’ and 
an ‘I’ which does not refer at all. And one may consider these by regarding the proper 
context in which they appear: the former appears in the context of descriptions of publicly 
available states of affairs while the latter in the context of descriptions of our ‘inner lives’, 
i.e., non-publicly available states of affairs. I believe that such a distinction can be seen 
as resolving problems which stem from Anscombe’s view as such. 
A common criticism of Anscombe’s position is that if ‘I’ is not a referring expression, 
why should we be confident in the inference pattern from, say, ‘I live in North Carolina’ 
to ‘Someone lives in North Carolina’ (in other words, existential generalization), or in 
fact that any inference pattern where ‘I’ is treated as if it refers is valid. Indeed, such an 
objection is only a technical expression of one’s natural reaction that Anscombe’s thesis 
is in and of itself incredible, difficult to understand at all.57 
 I do partially agree with Kripke in that it is quite explicitly the case that Anscombe 
is difficult to understand. Nonetheless, I believe that one may resolve this almost common 
sense objection. It is clear that the statement “I live in North Carolina” describes a 
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publicly available state of affairs: this body’s geographical location in North America. As 
such, the inference to “Someone lives in North Carolina” seems unobjectionable. But one 
must note that this utterance had to be made by someone. It might be the case that Kripke 
was not in North Carolina when he made that statement which does not diminish the 
possibility of such an inference pattern, i.e., the statement may be false nonetheless 
remaining the inference valid. This being said, given that that statement is framed in the 
FP one may reformulate it into “I think that ‘I live in North Carolina’”. The ‘I’ in the 
thought-statement refers to ‘this body’ because the specific context is that of a description 
of some publicly available such-and-such, which may possibly be given a truth-value. 
The reformulated statement as a whole does not describe a such-and-such of that 
availability but the ‘inner life’ of that which made that statement. In this context, however, 
the ‘I’ does not refer to ‘this body’ because one may plausibly hold that it does not refer 
at all. Hopefully, the reformulation resolves the initial problem in that the inference is not 
being made from the reformulated statement as a whole but from the thought-statement 
which, again, describes a publicly available state of affairs. One can, therefore, reconcile 
Anscombe’s position with that of the possibility of such inference pattern by noting the 
distinct context in which the two uses of ‘I’ appear. Given that the relevant ‘I’ in that 
context does not refer, and that ‘what’ one is describing is that such-and-such a thought 
is taking place, is it the case that one may infer anything from that statement as such? 
Note that I am not saying that it is not a body which thinks that thought – it must be - but 
that it seems that a specific description of this kind is not propitious for valid inferences. 
In Chapter 3 we will return to this. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
3. On Substance58 
 When the so-called full-blown incorrigible statements (FIS) were discussed in 
Chapter 1 they were plausibly posited into two distinct sub-groups: A1 and A2. The 
distinction between the statements of these sub-groups was asserted as a distinction 
between different characteristics of the specific verbs which we encounter in them. The 
paradigmatic examples of statements of these sub-groups were “I feel pain” and “I see 
red” - being that the proper matter-of-description is the ‘inner life’ of the utterer. Putting 
aside the particular categorization put forth, it can be plausibly held that the matter-of-
description of these statements may not universally be recognized as obvious. And this 
may be held as a consequence of the particular characteristics of the verbs in one of these 
sub-groups as will be explored. 
 Moreover, in this chapter we will be reflecting on the perennial metaphysical 
theme of substance so as to prepare the terrane for our final chapter in which the 
plausibility of holding that ambiguities with respect to the matter-of-description of certain 
statements stems from peculiar characteristics of some verbs. Before we get into our 
principal theme it is fundamental that we shed light on the particular interest in statements 
from one of these sub-groups in connection with our reflections on the notion of 
substance. 
 Let us concentrate on the prima facie understanding of a statement like “I have a 
headache”. It is rather straightforward that a statement of this ilk describes one’s ‘inner 
life’ in a way which is quite unambiguous. There seems to be no question as to our 
understanding of “headache” as a word introduced to describe such-and-such sensations 
on the part of the utterer. In other words, “headache” is not a word which is used to 
describe a particular publicly available state of affairs in the context of mental reports 
framed in the first person. Contrast this with the possible prima facie understanding of a 
statement such as “I see red”. It is plausibly the case that abstracting from the particular 
context in which it was uttered one may not be able to discern if the utterer is describing 
his ‘inner life’ or a publicly available state of affairs. It may be the case that the utterer 
merely sees some sort of after-image or the like. Now this is quite uncommon. One may 
be quite confident in asserting that in the overwhelming amount of cases in which one 
uses such verbs as “to see” or “to hear” one is describing such-and-such publicly available 
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X or at least such-and-such sensible property of X. Even though this is the case, it is 
reasonable to admit that there are cases where one uses these verbs in contexts where 
there is no – wholly or partially - publicly available matter which is being described. The 
philosophical significance of these cases will be considered in the subsequent chapter. Of 
interest in this chapter will be to further our understanding of correct uses of these 
statements so as to describe publicly available matters-of-description. Moreover, the 
understanding of different kinds of publicly available matters-of-description will be 
broadened. To do this, I will attend to the sub-themes of the recognition of spatiotemporal 
entities59 and the use of certain predicates to do so. 
3.1. The notion of substance and substantial kinds 
 At the end of her article, Anscombe makes an important distinction when 
discussing the notion of ‘idea’ in Locke’s work. She writes: 
And it seems as though in this conception the difference between the objective and the 
subjective appearance60– between the highlight, or colour changed by the light it is seen 
in, on the one hand, and the drug-induced or astigmatic colours and perspectives, on the 
other – is quite unimportant.61 
 The distinction being made between objective and subjective appearances is 
noteworthy inasmuch as concerns the objective appearances. One does not usually use 
these words in simultaneity for our common understanding of talk of appearances relates 
to some understanding of subjectivity62 - of e.g. incorrect descriptions of what is there. 
In this sense, saying “subjective appearances” is redundant. Now to speak of objectivity 
in this context is to make a point about the way we correctly describe spatiotemporal 
entities, or their properties, in a way which emphasizes that someone is making such-and-
such a description of X. In other words, and using the terminology put forth in my work, 
one may speak of publicly available appearances without there being any contradiction 
of terms. But what is the purpose of speaking in this fashion? It seems quite reasonable 
to assert that if one correctly describes such-and-such empirical X one is not describing 
how X appears but how X is. To clarify this point let us consider the specific predicates 
one uses so as to describe particular spatiotemporal entities. 
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3.1.1 Substances and their predicates 
 The importance of reflecting on these predicates is to clarify the different ways in 
which descriptions of sensible properties of spatiotemporal entities presuppose a certain 
conception of substance. In a rather straightforward way one will admit that paradigmatic 
examples of sensible properties are “colour, shape, being liquid, being hot, yielding no 
sound when rapped”63, etc. Even though one may group these under that title, there seems 
to be notable differences between them inasmuch as concerns descriptions of them. Being 
that our specific interest in this subject has to do with descriptions, we will pivot our 
attention to the particular predicates we use in statements which describe such sensible 
properties and their relation to a certain understanding of a conception of substance. Note 
that it has been assumed from the get-go – a point made in Chapter 1 – that vicissitudes 
of language are impactful on our understanding of certain philosophical themes. It will 
not be the objective of this work to delve into the merits of this position. Nonetheless, this 
will be treated in a more explicit fashion in Chapter 4 as a consequence of Anscombe’s 
thoughts in her article The Intentionality of Sensation (1965) which is the theoretical basis 
of that chapter. 
 In her article – Substance - Anscombe divides these predicates into three distinct 
groups: i) substantial predicates; ii) substance-involving predicates; and iii) neither 
substantial nor substance-involving predicates. We will look at these predicates in more 
detail and try to get to the reasoning behind the specific categorization. 
3.1.1.1 Substantial predicates 
 The author characterizes these predicates as such: “They tell you what kind or 
kinds of substance that lump of stuff is.”64 One can learn two things from this 
characterization. On the one hand, these predicates categorize such spatiotemporal 
entities into kinds of substances65; and, on the other, that these predicates presuppose a 
certain conception of substance as a lump of stuff. It is paramount to note that one may 
understand these predicates as implicit descriptions of sensible properties of some X. This 
implies that the categorization of X has to do with some kind or other of defining sensible 
properties of such X. In other words, not all descriptions of sensible properties of X will 
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have the same weight in the categorization; and such categorization into a substantial kind 
can be held as an implicit grouping of such defining properties. Consider the example “X 
is gold”. It is straightforward that such a predicate – “is gold” – categorizes X into what 
has been called a substantial kind. Now this particular X has n properties which one is 
sensibly acquainted with, which does not mean that all those sensible properties of the 
particular X determine the categorization which was made. In this sense, “is gold” is an 
implicit grouping of descriptions of such sensible properties as e.g. “is yellow-looking”, 
“melts at 1064.18 ºC”, “is prone to electrical conductivity”, etc., in an approximate way. 
This is important. It is the case that substantial kinds such as e.g. gold are thoroughly 
specified through the achievements of chemistry whereby to firmly determine that that 
particular X is gold one will investigate, at a molecular level, the particular constitution 
of that X. As being composed of a relevant amount of Au atoms, for example. In a sense, 
the only description which is relevant to the categorization of X is its particular chemical 
structure, i.e., “is gold” can be understood as an implicit description of the chemical 
constitution of such X. Despite this being the case, one can put aside this rigorous 
classification, for pragmatic purposes, and rely on the so-called approximate 
categorization via the consideration of those descriptions of sensible properties previously 
mentioned. 
 Following what was said thus far, I propose that one may understand substantial 
predicates in a pragmatic sense – where the substantial predicate implicitly describes 
relevant properties that some individual is more or less immediately acquainted with – 
and in a determinate sense – where the substantial predicate implicitly describes the 
underlying structure of X which is a sufficient condition upon which one categorizes X 
into the proper substantial kind. Note that the clarity of such a distinction is determined 
by the particular spatiotemporal entity one is considering. The relevance of such a 
distinction is to bring forth the inherent possibility of error in categorizing X into a 
specific substantial kind. Let us consider if the implicit descriptions, in the two sense 
considered, may be understood as themselves implying the specific substantial predicate. 
The pragmatic sense first. 
 Returning to the previous examples, is it the case that “is yellow-looking”, “melts 
at 1064.18 ºC”, “is prone to electrical conductivity”, etc., imply the substantial predicate 
“is gold”? Even though it is reasonable to assert that some list of these descriptions 
constitutes a necessary condition for the substantial predicate, it is a stretch to hold that 
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that list is a sufficient condition for the substantial predicate “is gold”. And this is the case 
because it is always possible that X can be correctly described by the list without X being 
correctly categorized into such-and-such a substantial kind. In other words, and to 
differing degrees depending on the particular spatiotemporal entity, error is always 
possible. Now it seems to be the case that the same may not be said of the determinate 
sense. That is, it is reasonable to hold that the description of the chemical structure of e.g. 
gold implies the substantial predicate “is gold”. Confirming the truth of the particular 
description being considered, there is no doubt as to that X being e.g. gold. In other words, 
the description of the chemical structure of X is a sufficient condition for the adequate 
categorization of X into the proper substantial kind. For the sake of clarity, one may put 
the distinction as such: 
i) Pragmatic sense: 𝑆𝑃 → 𝐿 
ii) Determinate sense: 𝑆𝑃 ↔ 𝐷𝑈𝑆66 
 Being this the case, it is reasonable to assert that DUS may also be held as a 
substantial predicate in itself for it satisfies the characterization given by the author in a 
way which L does not. In principle there may be spatiotemporal entities which can be 
described with the same L and, nonetheless, be in fact members of different substantial 
kinds. Once again, just because X is described by some L does not necessarily imply that 
the substantial predicate we are inclined to use correctly categorizes X into such-and-such 
a substantial kind. Note that one must not confuse the underlying structure of X with what 
may called a bare particular: 
[W]hich underlies the appearances and is the subject of predication but just for that reason 
can’t in itself be characterized by any predicates.67 
 The postulation of such a bare particular is to an extent a confusion as to the 
meaning of the question “What is X in itself?”, i.e., “[W]hat is the individual thing qua 
individual, in its individuality?”68 So, how do we understand “X qua X”? Are we to take 
this as a statement with no predicate – “X qua X” as a subject-term – or as a statement 
whose subject-term is “X” and whose predicate is “qua X”? If we go for the former then 
the implied answer to the question “What is X in itself?” is some kind of bare particular 
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67 Anscombe, G. 1964: 37. 
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as was previously stated; if we go for the latter, then we must investigate X as to uncover 
“[w]hat is always and necessarily true of it.”69 It is the latter which is meant by the 
underlying structure of X. To return to the previous point, it may be the case that some or 
all the descriptions which are grouped in L are not always true of X. Which subsequently 
may not be a firm basis upon which one categorizes X into such-and-such a substantial 
kind via a particular substantial predicate. Now the problem with accepting the former 
route – of postulating a bare particular – is, I believe, that this trivializes to a great extent 
the results of empirical investigations of X because it supposes that what X is remains 
over and above true descriptions of that X. This kind of reasoning is the same which 
catalysed criticism of Anscombe’s theory of action, particularly the correct understanding 
of the phrase “under a description”. 
I have on occasion stared dumbly when asked: “If one action can have many descriptions, 
what is the action, which has all these descriptions?” The question seemed to be supposed 
to mean something, but I could not get hold of it.70 
 The action, as the X, is the same such-and-such which is correctly described in 
various ways. Note that this does not mean that Leibniz’s Law is rejected, i.e., that 
because this X can be correctly described in various ways in some sense implies that it is 
not the same X which is being correctly described in all those statements. As Anscombe 
puts it: 
[W]hat would we say of a theory which grants that a certain man, Dickens wrote David 
Copperfield, and only this Dickens wrote Bleak House – but does not grant that “The 
author of David Copperfield” describes the same man as “The author of Bleak House”?71 
 The point is that even though it is the same X which is being described, only under 
a specific description can X be categorized into a particular substantial kind e.g. the 
substantial predicate describes what X is in itself. Any other understanding of “X qua X” 
or “X in itself” “supposes a continued identity independent of what is true of the object”72 
which amounts to saying that one cannot describe what X really is. If “X qua X” is treated 
as a subject-term then it refers, if it refers, to some object without sensible properties - 
which runs contrary to the feats of the rigorous sciences. 
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3.1.1.2 Substance-involving predicates 
 We have still to touch upon in an explicit fashion the second point made in the 
characterization of substantial predicates proposed by the author, i.e., that a certain 
conception of substance is presupposed when one uses such predicates. Before we get 
into this, we will expound on substance-involving predicates. Anscombe characterizes 
these predicates in the subsequent way: “Something must be that lump of stuff in order to 
be so much as a candidate for having malleability.”73 The paradigmatic example of a 
substance-involving predicate, as presented by the author, is “is malleable”. Note that by 
the way the author puts the process of characterizing X with such a predicate of this nature 
is not to categorize X into such-and-such a substantial kind, as with the predicates 
previously considered. Nonetheless, these predicates do reduce the range of possibilities. 
Considering the example being given – “is malleable” – one can see that not all instances 
of substantial kinds can be described with this particular predicate. Being this the case, if 
X is correctly described by that predicate we may conclude that e.g. X is not water in the 
current state it is being investigated. One must pay attention to this last point because e.g. 
water can be described as malleable when in its solid state. And it may also be the case 
that certain substance-involving predicates do not adequately describe all instances of a 
specific substantial kind. E.g. “is smooth” may not be applicable to all kinds of fish. 
 One can see, through these characterizations, that substance-involving predicates 
may reduce our scope of possibilities relative to the categorization of X without 
determining that X as being an instance of such-and-such a substantial kind. Returning to 
the initial point, both substantial predicates - in the two senses mentioned - and substance-
involving predicates presuppose the conception of X as a physical object. That is, the use 
of such predicates implies that the X being described is composed of some sort of stuff 
which is publicly available for evaluation. Note that this implies that one can be wrong in 
one’s description. Nonetheless, for one to describe X in such a way presupposes a certain 
conception of that X. Now, it is the case that there are publicly available matters-of-
description which, when described, do not imply this sort of conception. Let us take as 
examples rainbows and mirages. These are common phenomena which are publicly 
available and are not to be comparable to hallucinations and other kinds of ‘inner’ 
occurrences. Are “is a rainbow” and “is a mirage” to be counted as substantial predicates? 
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It is the case that these phenomena can be explained in a rigorous way, being a 
conjunction of certain environmental conditions and particular bodily determinations of 
the observer. Nonetheless, it is a stretch to conclude that the phenomena being described 
by “is a rainbow” and “is a mirage” are instances of substantial kinds. If this was the case 
one could describe them by the use of substance-involving predicates. At this point one 
must avoid certain confusions. In 3.1.1.1 a distinction was made between two ways one 
can understand substantial predicates: in a pragmatic sense and in a determinate sense. 
By using a substantial predicate in the former sense we are grouping a list of descriptions 
of sensible properties that we are more or less immediately acquainted with. But note that 
this does not mean that descriptions of these properties are to be taken, a priori, as 
substance-involving predicates. Let us take a look at the examples given in 3.1.1.1.: “is 
yellow-looking”, “melts at 1064.18 ºC”, “is prone to electrical conductivity”, etc. It is the 
case that we have two examples of substance-involving predicates: “melts at 1064.18 ºC” 
and “is prone to electrical conductivity”. These predicates do necessarily imply that the 
X being described has a physical existence, i.e., that the X is composed of a kind of stuff. 
The description “is yellow-looking” does not necessarily imply this. It may be the case 
that one is describing a publicly available phenomena which does not have a physical 
existence - as is the case with rainbows and mirages - or even that one may be merely 
describing one’s ‘inner life’ and there is no X which is there. The point is that descriptions 
of such properties as e.g. colours are not to be considered as substance-involving for they 
do not necessarily imply that the particular X being considered is a lump of stuff, which 
does not mean that spatiotemporal entities cannot be described by the use of these 
predicates. In other words, while substantial predicates and substance-involving 
predicates necessarily presuppose the conception of X as being composed of some kind 
of stuff, these predicates which are neither substantial nor substance-involving do not. 
For the sake of clarity the point will be made as such: 
iii) (𝑆𝑃˅𝑆𝐼𝑃) → 𝐶𝐿𝑆; 
iv) 𝑁𝑆𝑃 → (𝐶𝐿𝑆˅74¬𝐶𝐿𝑆) 75 
 We have already touched upon fundamental lines of reasoning. It is the case that 
the particular L which is implied by substantial predicates in the pragmatic sense is 
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composed of either substance-involving predicates or neither substantial nor substance-
involving predicates. Again, the descriptions which are implied by substantial predicates 
in the determinant sense are themselves substantial predicates. Nevertheless, both these 
understandings of substantial predicates presuppose the conception of the X in 
consideration as a physical object. This may also be said of substance-involving 
predicates. This is noteworthy because the predicates previously mentioned – substance-
involving predicates - necessarily imply that X is not only publicly available, but that it 
is a particular kind of publicly available object: a physical entity. This is the reason for 
the non-adequacy of these predicates in describing such publicly available phenomena as 
rainbows or mirages. E.g.: 
[I]f I asked you to see if the rainbow would melt at 44ºC, this would imply a conception 
of a rainbow as composed of stuff, so that a sample of it could be brought away and 
subjected to tests.76 
 Even though this is the case, these kinds of phenomena are publicly available and 
descriptions of these can be incorrect. Notice the difference between these and e.g. 
hallucinations which are non-publicly available. Predicates which do not fit within these 
two kinds, i.e., substantial and substance-involving predicates, have a wider range of use 
for they do not presuppose a specific conception of the X being considered. Furthermore, 
they are also used in descriptions of one’s ‘inner life’. 
3.1.1.3 Secondary-quality words 
 The distinction between publicly available states of affairs and non-publicly 
available states of affairs is of great importance for the notion of truth. I see that it is 
strictly necessary that for a description of X to be true that X must be publicly available. 
I believe that it is quite absurd to assert that the description of such-and-such is only true 
for me, something which people commonly assert: “This is my truth” and other nonsense 
of the like. Note that the matter-of-description has to be publicly accessible in principle: 
just because some particular individual is the first to see a particular fallen tree or the first 
to prove Fermat’s last theorem does not mean that those matters-of-description77 were in 
principle only accessible to that individual. This is totally unlike one’s ‘inner life’ which 
is a matter-of-description only accessible to a particular individual which, when 
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described, has implications for the applicability of the concept of truth. It is this point 
which fleshes out the reasoning behind calling certain statements incorrigible: that 
because the matter-of-description is non-publicly available, one may say that these 
statements are neither true nor false. To say that a certain description of my ‘inner life’ is 
true is to say that it is true for me, for only I can, in principle, access it. The process of 
presenting mathematical or logical proofs, or that of describing fundamental phenomena 
of the physical world, rests upon the assumption that the particular matters-of-description 
are publicly available which casts doubt, I believe, upon the possibility of a science of 
first person mental phenomena. 
 Note that this does not imply a particular ontological position. As was said, both 
this chair and that rainbow are publicly available, remaining the ‘ontological step’ to be 
made. What is the interest in this for our current endeavour? The interest resides in the 
applicability of neither substantial nor substance-involving predicates to different kinds 
of publicly available states of affairs. The sensible properties being described by those 
predicates are what was called in modern philosophy “secondary qualities” such as colour 
and sound – the predicates used to describe these will be called secondary-quality words 
from now on. 
To receive impressions of secondary qualities, you merely have to let the appropriate 
sense-organ be affected78; that is why one can always imagine that the quality is a mere 
sense content.79 
 It is the case that the sensible properties which are described by the use of 
substance-involving predicates also affect the appropriate sense-organs. The difference 
stems from the range of matters-of-description which can be described through them. 
Note that one can use secondary-quality words to describe one’s ‘inner life’ which does 
not mean that the appropriate sense-organ is affected: e.g. one may be afflicted with the 
continued repetition of a popular song in one’s head, where one may say “I hear that song 
in my head”. Nonetheless, this does not mean that one’s ears are receiving such-and-such 
oscillations of particles which we commonly call sound. Putting these cases aside for 
now, one is to understand “letting the appropriate sense-organ be afflicted” as marking 
the ‘neutrality’ in one’s specific conception of the publicly available X being considered. 
E.g. the description of the colour of X does not necessarily imply that that X is a physical 
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entity, as with the case of mirages. That this is the case has peculiar implications for our 
understanding of substantial predicates, particularly in the pragmatic sense. It was 
emphasized that the L which is implied by a predicate of this sort groups both substance-
involving predicates and secondary-quality words. Now the fact that the latter predicates 
do not necessarily imply a particular conception of the publicly available X being 
described is quite important for the understanding of some uses of substantial predicates. 
We will explore this point and the relation with the use of secondary-quality words to 
describe one’s ‘inner life’. 
3.2 Objective and subject appearances 
 We started this chapter off by reflecting on the distinction, presented by the author, 
between objective and subjective appearances. This distinction can be made by the 
terminology used throughout this work, i.e., as the distinction between publicly available 
matters-of-description and non-publicly available matters-of-description. But it remains 
to be explained the use of the word “appearance” in connexion with both these matters-
of-description. Anscombe characterizes an appearance as “a way things strike the 
senses”80. Note that the author also characterized the properties which are described by 
secondary-quality words in the same fashion. But why is this? Suppose that one is 
presented with an X which one is inclined to describe as a human being. One proceeds to 
use the substantial predicate “is a human being” basing one’s description on the way X 
looks. Now just because it looks like a human being does not necessarily imply that it is, 
just as the use of substance-involving predicates does not necessarily imply a particular 
categorization of that X into a specific substantial kind. Various instances of substantial 
kinds may be described by the same substance-involving predicate. But one is basing the 
description “is a human being” on the way X looks which has to do with the way X is 
visually presented, i.e., “the secondary qualities81, together with their qualifications of 
size, shape and mutual arrangement.”82 It is the case that human beings all have a common 
shape and a more or less determined size – abstracting from particular variations – 
particular skin complexions and, if dressed, particular clothing with their particular 
colours. So when one bases one’s description – “is a human being” – on the way X looks, 
one is basing one’s description on the criterion previously mentioned. Again, this does 
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not mean that X is a human being: it might be a very convincing robot or a hologram. 
Pushing this point further, given the bases of one’s use of that particular substantial 
predicate, one cannot discern merely by the way X immediately looks if X is a non-
publicly available state of affairs – thereby being no X there - or a publicly available state 
of affairs. Moreover, even if one knew that X was a publicly available state of affairs, the 
way X looks is still neutral with respect to the particular conception of X as either a 
physical object or not. Note that if one were to base one’s substantial predicate on 
properties which are described by substance-involving predicates one could still be 
wrong, but the X would neither be a non-publicly available state of affairs nor a non-
physical object. It is important to clarify that if the X was a non-publicly available state 
of affairs – a mental image – and one based one’s substantial predicate on what one saw, 
one will not conclude that that description was false. It is the case that that individual did 
see a mental image which one discerned as fit to be described by a particular substantial 
predicate. One may discover the particular availability of that matter-of-description 
without having to correct the description of what one saw. As was said in 3.1.1.3., that 
one saw a mental image does not mean that the proper sense-organ was affected by that 
mental image. Once again, because the matter-of-description is only available to the 
particular individual one may refrain from attributing a truth-value to the statement, i.e., 
it is incorrigible. 
 The point of talk of appearances has to do specifically with secondary-quality 
words. Suppose that the X being described by “is a human being” is in fact a convincing 
robot. Just because X is not a human being does not mean that the way it appeared to 
such-and-such individual is not a publicly available way of appearing. Moreover, even if 
the substantial predicate did correctly describe X, X still appeared to be an instance of a 
particular substantial kind and in fact it was. This was the point in the distinction between 
objective appearances and subjective appearances. On the one hand, we have matters-of-
description which appear to an individual in a certain way but whose availability is limited 
to that particular individual – this is the way we usually understand the use of the word 
“appearances” as relating to subjectivity; on the other, we have matters-of-description 
which appear to an individual in a certain way, but whose availability is public. Again, 
just because a particular X appears a certain way does not mean that the way it appears is 
not the way it really is. In this sense, when one describes the appearances of a certain X 
– e.g. the way X looks – one’s descriptions may be true or false. Notice that the substantial 
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predicates one is inclined to use when one considers the appearances of X are to be 
understood in the pragmatic sense for the way X appears may not be the way X is. It 
would be sufficient, if one were to understand the substantial predicate in the determinate 
sense, for the description of a certain defining property of X to categorize it as an instance 
of a particular substantial kind. That one is using substantial predicates in the pragmatic 
sense in this context is what permits their use in talk of appearances for substantial 
predicates group descriptions of certain properties, which in this case are those which are 
described by secondary-quality words.83 
 An important point to retain is that contrary to secondary-quality words, 
substance-involving predicates are not to be introduced in appearance talk. This in part 
has to do with the way in which these predicates presuppose a conception of X as a 
physical object, and that in the overwhelming amount of cases one is not introduced to a 
particular X through the properties described by those predicates. Let us explore this. 
Suppose that one uses the predicate “is smooth” to describe some X. If this description is 
correct, is it the case that that X appears to one in that way? It may be the case that X 
appears to be smooth because the way it looks may incline one to think so. But in this 
case one is concentrating on properties which are described by secondary-quality words 
and not substance-involving predicates. That is, it does not seem to be plausible that such 
properties as smoothness can appear to one to be otherwise. Something might look a 
certain way, or something’s colour might appear to one to be such-and-such, without this 
meaning that X really looks that way or that its colour is really that which one is inclined 
to describe as e.g. “is green”. Properties such as smoothness or ‘melts at 50ºC’ cannot 
appear to be otherwise. What can appear to be otherwise is the way X may e.g. look: it 
may look smooth, etc.84 This being said, when one proceeds to inquire into those 
properties which are described by substance-involving predicates: 
[T]he lump is generally already known to be a lump of stuff of a certain kind – a bit of 
copper, say – and the kind is told you more or less specifically by the substantial 
predicates.85 
 Following what was said until know, one can grasp the reason for our interest in 
statements from A2, particularly our interest in the prima facie understanding of these 
                                                             
83 Excluding, as such, substance-involving predicates. 
84 It is quite dubious that some X can look like it e.g. melts at 50ºC. 
85 Anscombe, G. 1964: 41. 
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statements. They can be rather ambiguous as to the matter-of-description being described. 
If one does not know the particular context in which an instance of these statements is 
uttered, one may be in a position where one is not able to discern if one is describing a 
publicly available state of affairs or one’s ‘inner life’. Moreover, excluding for the sake 
of argument the latter, one may not be able to discern if the publicly available state of 
affairs is a physical object or not – or the properties of a physical object or not. All this 
being said, depending on the context of the utterance or one’s particular perceptual 
relation with the X, one may be able to discover that that what one thought was an X is 
nothing more than an occurrence in one’s ‘inner life’ or that one’s description is of a 
publicly available such-and-such of which one can be corrected. Progressing to the next 
chapter, one must hold in mind that the vicissitudes here delineated are achieved through 
a “gradual process of discovery”86 which is a public matter, i.e., clarifications as to the 
details of that which is being described via secondary-quality words, or the correctness 
or incorrectness of them, do not reside solely in the immediate experience of those 
properties by a particular individual, but on the testimony of others and in our particular 
location and the like when such descriptions are made. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
86 Anscombe, G. 1964: 43. 
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4. How to understand sensation-reports87 
 In Chapter 3 I sought to further the understanding of different kinds of publicly 
available states of affairs which can be described by statements from A2 abstracted from 
this particular classification. Note that the categorization of these statements into A2 
already implies that they are incorrigible, i.e., that they describe one’s ‘inner life’. We 
considered these statements before any such categorization. Now it was said that 
ambiguities with respect to the matter-of-description of these statements considered at 
their face value – if an instance of these describes one’s ‘inner life’, a physical object or 
non-physical object – stems in part from certain supposed characteristics of the specific 
verbs which we encounter in them. 
 Returning to our first chapter, it was said that there were three defining 
characteristics of statements from A: ‘I’ does not refer to ‘this body’; ii) the verbs are 
having their intentional use; and iii) the words which are being employed in describing 
such-and-such are having their secondary application. Point i), which is common to 
statements from A and B, was discussed in Chapter 2 where it was reasoned that ‘I’ in the 
context of statements framed in the first person could only refer to some sort of Cartesian 
Ego (CE). Being that this possibility was plausibly negated, I concluded that ‘I’ does not 
refer to ‘this body’ – in the context previously mentioned - because it is not a word whose 
function is to refer at all! This absence of reference of the subject-term in statements 
framed in the first person is a fundamental aspect of descriptions of one’s ‘inner life’ in 
that one does not look for the supposed reference of that word. Moreover, one does not 
infer from behaviours of ‘this body’ that such-and-such is taking place in one’s ‘inner 
life’. Point ii) and iii) have been considered together but not in a thoroughly explicit 
fashion. In Chapter 3 I assumed from the get-go that the particular verbs which we 
encounter in statements from A2 have some peculiar characteristics which justify the 
ambiguity of the matter-of-description of these statements abstracted from the particular 
context of utterance. In this chapter we will consider what is meant by point ii) so as to 
extend our understanding of point iii) and complement what was discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
 
                                                             
87 Based on The Intentionality of Sensation (1965). 
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4.1 Intentionality as a feature of sensation-verbs 
 There is a certain common ground between incorrect descriptions of publicly 
available states of affairs and incorrigible statements. In both these cases one e.g. sees 
something that is in part or wholly not there. In other words, both these kinds of 
statements may give rise to the question “What do you see?” which seems to imply an 
answer describing some publicly available such-and-such. Now in both these cases one 
cannot give what is asked, but in different ways: on the one hand, there is really something 
there but described incorrectly, and on the other there isn’t anything there to be found via 
that description. Even though this is the case, in both situations one may still answer that 
question e.g. “I see a white ball” – which in fact is grey – and “I see a black ball” – where 
there isn’t any publicly available such-and-such of that sort. Would it not be better to 
answer the question by saying on the one hand, “I see a grey ball” and on the other “I see 
nothing” after learning of the respective predicament? These answers seem to be more 
accurate given the particular circumstances. That is, even though one says one sees such-
and-such what one really sees is W or the absence of W. It seems to be the case that giving 
the previous answers avoids to an extent embarrassing questions regarding the ontological 
status of ‘what’ one sees. Anscombe suggests that one can answer the question “What do 
you see?” with “I see a white ball” and “I see a black ball” without implying the reification 
of that which one sees. 
4.1.1 What is a direct object? 
 To make this point the author considers the grammatical concept of the direct 
object. Take the statement “Joe hit the table”. If one were to ask for the direct object of 
the verb one would respond by saying “The table”. Note that that statement is not being 
considered as a description of such-and-such but being considered so as to achieve 
grammatical understanding. That this is the case is quite important with regard to the 
ontological status of e.g. the direct object. One may ask: “What is a direct object?” To 
answer this question one may possibly say two things. On the one hand, one may say that 
the direct object is what the piece of language stands for: “the table” stands for the direct 
object. On the other, one may say that the piece of language itself is the direct object; as 
such “the table” is the direct object. Now both these answers are problematic in a similar 
way. Imagine a professor who is regarding the statement and asks a student of the former 
inclination “What did Joe hit?”, answered by “A direct object”. Now the professor asks a 
student of the latter inclination the same question which is answered by “A piece of 
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language”. Both these answers do not seem plausible in the particular context which we 
are considering. A plausible answer to this question would simply be “The table”. And it 
is this answer which the imagined professor was looking for. 
 But why is it the case that the first answers strike us as absurd and the last one 
doesn’t? It seems that the word “object” is what confused the first students. As we saw in 
the last chapter, to ask “what is such-and-such object?” implies that i) we are considering 
a spatiotemporal entity, and ii) that a possible answer involves some sort of substantial 
predicate that will categorize that object into a substantial kind. In other words, that which 
underlies the answers “a direct object” and “piece of language” is that particular context 
of investigation. In other words, these answers are a consequence of a context of 
investigation where one strives for the ontological underpinning of that sentence, where 
a direct object is either what “the table” stands for or the words themselves. In this sense, 
one is bound to reify either the grammatical notion of the direct object or the piece of 
language itself. The answer given by the last student avoids this context. It does not make 
sense to confront the answer “the table” with “what table?” because the specific context 
does not necessitate such retorts – as would be the case if one were speaking of 
spatiotemporal entities: “what is the X you are speaking of?”. As such, 
The interest of the question [“what did Joe hit?”] and answer [“the table”] is the rather 
special interest of getting grammatical understanding.88 
 One must have an ‘ear’, as the author says, for the specific context of investigation 
– in this case of achieving grammatical understanding of the sentence – so that one doesn’t 
fall into the trap that the first students found themselves in.89 The importance of reflecting 
on this is to expand our understanding of object in a way which does not imply the 
reification of what one is discussing. 
4.1.2 Intentional objects 
 The interest in this point about direct objects is to cover what Anscombe calls 
intentional objects which are a sub-class of that notion with some unique characteristics. 
                                                             
88 Anscombe, G. 1965: 8. 
89 For methodological reasons, the author finds it fit to say that e.g. “the table” gives the direct object without 
with this implying the reification of the notion of the direct object as that which “the table” stands for, in a 
similar fashion as one of the first students understood it. 
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 As the phrase implies, these objects are direct objects which are characterized by 
features we encounter relative to action. These are: 
a) “Possible non-existence of the object”90; 
b) “Non-substitutability of different descriptions of the object, where it does exist”91; 
c) “Possible indeterminacy of the object”92. 
 Note that, just as in the case of direct objects, the discussion of intentional objects 
does not mean that we are considering some special sort of entity. One has already 
encountered examples giving these objects: “a white ball” – from the statement “I see a 
white ball” – and “a black ball” – from the statement “I see a black ball”. The specific 
interest in these statements was that there was no entity out there which would be 
described thus. Nevertheless, this possibly would not restrain one from answering the 
question “what do you see?” with “a white ball” or “a black ball”. Attending to the 
particular statements being discussed one can grasp that the given intentional object of 
the latter statement – “I saw a black ball” – satisfies a): there is no entity out there which 
is being described. Note that the phrase giving the intentional object in the statement “I 
see a white ball” incorrectly describes a particular entity, which, nonetheless, is there. 
The previous statement satisfies b) in that even though the phrase which gives the 
intentional object incorrectly describes that grey ball, confronted with the question “what 
do you see?” one would not grant that one saw a grey ball. The intentional object is here 
being considered as under a specific description. “A grey ball” will not give the 
intentional object in this context.93 Being that “a white ball” incorrectly describes that 
grey ball does not mean that the entity is indeterminate. That is, the corresponding entity 
is still an entity with a particular size, shape, in a determinate spatial position, etc. even if 
the phrase giving the intentional object incorrectly describes it. This is not the case with 
the phrase giving the intentional object from the statement “I saw a black ball”. Being 
that there is nothing out there which one is describing, asking the utterer for e.g. the size 
of that which was seen is in a sense innocuous. These considerations justify the assertion 
that “a white ball” and “a black ball” give intentional objects. 
                                                             
90 Anscombe, G. 1965: 4. 
91 Anscombe, G. 1965: 5. 
92 Anscombe, G. 1965: 6. 
93 “An intentional object is given by a word or phrase which gives a description under which.” Anscombe, 
G. 1981: 9. 
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4.1.3 Material objects 
 In Chapter 3 we discussed in some detail that just because an X is publicly 
available need not necessarily imply that that X is a spatiotemporal entity. The 
paradigmatic examples of this were such phenomena as mirages, or holograms. In these 
cases, one is discussing a such-and-such which is out there without necessarily suggesting 
that the matter-of-description is made up of stuff. This is what led me to negate that such 
predicates as “is a mirage” or “is a hologram” are to be considered as substantial 
predicates. Picking up on our expanded notion of object, the author introduces what is 
called the material object. These objects are possibly indicated or described by the phrase 
giving the intentional object when there is something out there independently of the 
adequacy of the description. Let us consider a previous example. As was said, “a white 
ball” gives the intentional object in the statement “I see a white ball”. Now there really is 
a such-and-such out there but which is incorrectly described by “a white ball”. That being 
said, one may say that, nonetheless, the material object of the phrase “a white ball” is the 
thing which is out there: in this case, the grey ball. In other words, even though the 
description “a white ball” does not adequately describe the entity which one is perceiving, 
there still is something there. And it is this which is the material object of the phrase “a 
white ball”. 
 It may have been the case that there really was a white ball which the utterer sees 
which would lead one to conclude that the intentional object, which is given by the phrase 
“a white ball” may be reduced to the material object which is described by that phrase, 
i.e., the publicly available white ball. But one must be careful about what this means. That 
one can say, in this situation, that the intentional object can be reduced to the material 
object is not to say that in this case the publicly available white ball is an intentional 
object. The intentional object is given by the phrase “white ball” which has – the phrase 
- as its material object the publicly available white ball. Note that to say “the publicly 
available white ball is an intentional object” is to fall into the same trap as the student 
which sought to reify a grammatical notion. One must attend to the context in which we 
are dwelling. The phrase which gives the intentional object may indicate a material object 
without with this implying that the former – the direct object - is an entity. Moreover, the 
material object does not necessarily have to be an entity, i.e., of a such-and-such made up 
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of stuff. The author uses as an example “a debt of five dollars”94. As with the case of 
mirages or holograms – acknowledging that these can be perceived while to the say the 
same of debt is quite dubious95 - debt is a publicly available state of affairs without with 
this implying that it is a physical object. As such, “is in debt” may not be understood as a 
substantial predicate. 
 Following this discussion, what is the material object of the phrase “a black ball” 
in the statement “I see a black ball”96? It is the case that the intentional object is given by 
the phrase “a black ball”, but in this particular case there is no material object which is 
indicated by that phrase, i.e. there is no publicly available such-and-such out there which 
one perceives. Note that, in this situation, it is not the case that the phrase “a black ball” 
incorrectly describes a publicly available such-and-such, but that there is no publicly 
available X in this case. As such, one may conclude that that phrase only gives the 
intentional object. 
4.1.4 Intentional objects, intentional verbs and material objects 
 Now that one has, hopefully, grasped what is meant by these objects, we will be 
looking at the specific verbs which we encounter in these statements. Anscombe sees as 
fit to make an analogy between action and perceiving. Note that this is not an analogy 
between physical processes but an analogy between the language which expresses the 
concepts in play, i.e., what she calls “concepts of sensation”97. It is because of this that 
she uses the word “intentional” with respect to intentional objects and with respect to the 
specific verbs of our interest, i.e., intentional verbs. In the beginning of her article she 
makes the point that it is common to speak of the particular context in which we are 
engaging as intensional, while one speaks of intentionality in such contexts as philosophy 
of mind or in the philosophy of action. Anscombe chooses to use the word “intentional” 
in this context so as to point out similar characteristics which we find in connection with 
reflections on action and that of deliberations with respect to the language used in 
sensation-reports. She writes: 
I prefer to keep the older spelling with two ts. For the word is the same as the one in 
common use in connection with action. The concept of intention which we use there of 
                                                             
94 Anscombe, G. 1965: 11. 
95 Note that one may perceive e.g. the agony - which may translate as particular behaviours of an individual 
- of that which is in debt, but not debt as such. 
96 Remember that this statement describes one’s ‘inner life’. 
97 Anscombe, G. 1965: 4. 
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course occurs also in connection with saying. That makes the bridge to the logician’s 
use.98 
 That is, the way in which one speaks of perceiving such-and-such is marked by 
characteristics which we find in connection with action, i.e., a), b) or c). Once again, this 
is not to say that the physical processes of perceiving are marked by the concept of 
intention but that the language used to speak of perception is marked by what may be 
called intentionality. Now the interest in direct objects a fortiori in intentional objects 
comes as a consequence of the way in which intentionality is expressed in sensation-
reports, i.e., “these [a), b) or c)] are expressed by verbs commonly taking direct objects”99, 
as with our case studies – “I see a white ball” and “I see a black ball” with their respective 
context. 
 Returning to point ii) in the beginning of the chapter – the verbs are having their 
intentional use – one can see how the intentional use of the verb is connected with the 
intentional object. That is, a verb is having its intentional use when it takes an intentional 
object, i.e., a direct object which may be characterized by a), b) or c). As such, the verb 
“to see” in our chosen statements is having its intentional use for it takes the intentional 
objects which were discussed. Now it may be the case that that verb takes a material 
object. Consider the statement “I see a white ball”. As was said, the material object of this 
statement is the publicly available grey ball, which may lead one to modify the statement 
into “I see a grey ball”. In this case, the verb is not having its intentional use but its 
material use for the phrase “a grey ball” adequately describes what is there. The same is 
not the case with the statement “I see a black ball”. As was noted, there is nothing out 
there which is being described by “a black ball”. As such, the verb can only take an 
intentional object – given by the phrase “a black ball” – deeming the use of that verb 
intentional. 
 It is important to clarify a possible misunderstanding. In the given case of the 
statement “I see a grey ball” where the material object is a publicly available such-and-
such, which is adequately described by the phrase “a grey ball”, one can still say that the 
intentional object is given by that same phrase, i.e., “a grey ball”. This is an important 
point which leads us to the final remarks from Chapter 3. 
                                                             
98 Anscombe, G. 1965: 4. 
99 Anscombe, G. 1965: 4. 
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4.2 The gradual process of discovery 
 An important theme in the last chapter was that of the ambiguousness of the 
matter-of-description of sensation-reports taken at their face value. This was said to be 
the case because some statement of this ilk can be understood as describing both publicly 
available and non-publicly available states of affairs. Note that here one must be careful 
about the meaning of this ambiguity. This does not mean that our perceptual experience 
is, in principal, also ambiguous in respect to the matter-of-observation. That is, just 
because one may consider sensation-reports abstracted from their particular context of 
utterance does not imply that our perceptual experiences are abstracted from such 
contexts. This is quite important so that one is not led into illusion by the linguistic 
expression of the previously enumerated characteristics of intentionality. 
 In this respect, one must emphasize that the consideration of these statements 
abstracted from their particular context of utterance serves the specific purpose of 
achieving grammatical understanding which is paralleled in the case of the imagined 
professor. When considering the sentence “Joe hit the table” followed by the question 
“What did Joe hit?” it was not implied that that statement was describing anything at all. 
This is why the adequate response – “the table” – does not involve the reification of that 
which Joe was said to hit. In other words, questions as to the ontological status of that 
which Joe was said to hit are quite innocuous in situations where one is striving to achieve 
grammatical understanding of the particular sentence being considered. The same may be 
said of the consideration of sensation-reports abstracted from the particular context of 
utterance. Given the statement “I see a black ball” one may, without knowing that which 
is being described, answer the question “What do you see?” with “a black ball”. As was 
said, that phrase gives the intentional object. Now this does not mean that ‘what’ one saw 
was an intentional object; rather, this notion is here being used so as to achieve 
grammatical understanding of the statement in question. 
 It is important to highlight that the importance of making this point about the 
consideration of sensation-reports abstracted from their context of utterance is to show 
that the use of verbs such as “to see” can be used in contexts where the material object is 
not wholly or totally there. In other words, one may use e.g. that verb in cases where one 
inadequately describes ‘what’ is seen and even when one is describing one’s ‘inner life’ 
but with the caveat that the verb is having its intentional use, i.e., it can only take an 
intentional object. Now it is to the point that one discovers that this is the case, for the 
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particular utterance of these statements is made in a particular context. When one utters 
sensation-reports it is the case that one intends, in the overwhelming amount of cases, to 
use the verb not in its intentional use but in its material use. In other words, it is the case 
that the primary purpose of uttering sensation-reports is to correctly describe publicly 
available states of affairs. Now one may discover that one has failed to correctly describe 
that which was intended to be described or that one was really describing a non-publicly 
available such-and-such. In both cases it may be said that the utterer modified his 
understanding of the verb being used, given the circumstances, from having its material 
and primary application to its intentional use, which does not pick out a publicly available 
matter but only an intentional object. The inverse case, which was already mentioned, 
may happen, i.e., that one intended to use the verb in its intentional use – taking the 
intentional object – but discovered that the adequate use of the verb, given the 
circumstance, is its material use taking a material object. It was in this sense that it was 
said that the intentional object may reduce to the material object. 
 To conclude, given the particular characteristics of these statements one may 
answer our initial question – “What do you see?” – with the phrase giving the intentional 
object without with this implying that ‘what’ one e.g. sees in one’s ‘inner life’ or ‘what’ 
one sees in cases of failure of adequate perception was an intentional object being that 
the material object is partially or wholly not there. 
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Conclusion 
 Given the particular content which was presented in this dissertation, the 
overarching theme is hopefully clear to the reader. One of the fundamental distinctions 
made throughout was that between publicly available and non-publicly available states of 
affairs. Both these matters-of-description were considered in a detailed way. This work 
started off with the consideration of that which one may hold as a mental event, i.e., the 
proper denizens of the latter matter-of-description. In other words, I sought to make 
explicit that that which may be held as non-publicly available states of affairs are thoughts 
and sensations. Note that these considerations were based upon reflections on mental 
reports. A fundamental point made relative to statements which describe tout court these 
matters-of-description was that if they were to be justified, one would not appeal to such-
and-such bodily behaviours but to one’s ‘inner life’. That one would proceed in this 
fashion shows the circularity and therefore the innocuousness of pressing their 
justification, i.e., the justification of incorrigible statements. As was made clear both in 
the Introduction and in Chapter 1 the consideration of this possibility was to make a 
theoretical point about them. To show why they do not need to be justified. As much as 
to make explicit the importance of the present indicative and to distinguish them from 
mental reports framed in the TP. 
 One also noticed relative to non-publicly available states of affairs that 
descriptions of them, which are in the FP, contain an ‘I’ which does not refer. It is not 
that the word does not refer to ‘this body’ but that it does not refer at all. This seems to 
be coherent with what was previously said: that one will not appeal to particular 
behaviours of ‘this body’ in order to report on one’s ‘inner life’. Furthermore, that only 
the individual utterer in question can access that which he is describing seems 
consequential with respect to the applicability of the concept of truth to these statements. 
That is, given that the matter-of-description is non-publicly available, descriptions of this 
cannot, I believe, be deemed as true or false.100 
 I also considered in more detail publicly available states of affairs. Through the 
consideration of descriptions of these matters-of-description on plausibly concluded that 
there are different kinds of publicly available states of affairs. That is, I considered 
                                                             
100 It is particularly annoying when statements like “This is my truth” or “That hurts my feelings/is 
offensive” are used in the context of political discourse. 
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statements which presuppose that some X is a physical such-and-such while others where 
this is not the case. It is quite important that the predicate used in these particular 
statements can also be used to describe non-publicly available states of affairs. While in 
the former cases one is describing something there with particular properties, in the latter 
case one is not. Nonetheless, one does use these statements so as to describe one’s ‘inner 
life’. As was made evident, this can be plausibly held as a consequence of the particular 
verbs being used. 
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